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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TROY LABRUM, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 970099-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 provides: 
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons 
-- Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in 
Subsection (4) in concert with two or more persons 
is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense 
as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used 
in this section means the defendant and two or more 
other persons would be criminally liable for the 
offense as parties under Section 76-2-202. 
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if 
an indictment is returned, shall cause to be 
subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases 
or the information or indictment in felony cases 
notice that the defendant is subject to the 
enhanced penalties provided under this section. 
The notice shall be in a clause separate from and 
in addition to the substantive offense charged. 
(b) If the subscription is not included 
initially, the court may subsequently allow the 
prosecutor to amend the charging document to 
include the subscription if the court finds the 
charging documents, including any statement of 
probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of 
the allegation he committed the offense in concert 
with two or more persons, or if the court finds the 
defendant has not otherwise been substantially 
prejudiced by the omission. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed 
under this section are: 
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the 
convicted person shall serve a minimum term of 90 
consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the 
convicted person shall serve a minimum term of 18 0 
consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the 
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced 
minimum term of three years in prison. 
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the 
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced 
minimum term of six years in prison. 
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the 
convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced 
minimum term of nine years in prison. 
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which 
a life sentence is imposed, the convicted person 
shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 2 0 years in 
prison. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 
37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, regarding drug-related 
offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 
76, Chapter 5, Part 3 ; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in 
Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 
76, Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related 
offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 
76, Chapter 6, Part 3 ; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Part 4; 
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Part 5, except Sections 76-6-503, 76-6-504, 
76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 
76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 
76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 76-6-520; 
(2) any offense of obstructing government 
operations under Part 3, Title 76, Chapter 8, 
2 
except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 
76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation 
of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal 
proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Part 3; 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 
10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and 
performances offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 
76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 
15, Bus Passenger Safety Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 
16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 
76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 
19, Money Laundering and Currency Transaction 
Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in 
Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate 
offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the 
primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced 
penalties under this section that the persons with 
whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert 
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or 
convicted, or that any of those persons are charged 
with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury 
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty 
under this section. The imposition of the penalty 
is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing 
judge that this section is applicable. In 
conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter 
written findings of fact concerning the 
applicability of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution 
of the sentence required under this section if the court: 
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be 
best served; and 
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying 
the disposition on the record and in writing. 
3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995) provides: 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct 
commission of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense who directly 
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be 
criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or other infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides: 
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of las; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws. 
4 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees 
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, 
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to 
a preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable 
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. 
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule 
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding 
with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate 
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment --
Grand jury.] 
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Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted 
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the 
examination be waived by the accused with the consent 
of the State, or by indictment, with or without such 
examination and commitment. The formation of the grand 
jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as 
prescribed by the Legislature. 
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, 
AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
1. Whether the State elicited sufficient evidence 
with respect to the mens rea of Joshua Behunin to support 
imposition of the gang enhancement? 
Standard of review. While ordinarily factual findings 
are reviewed for clear error, here a correction of error standard 
applies. Judge Stirba, who was not present at trial, made her 
findings based on the transcript of the trial. See State v. 
Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 898 (Utah App. 1993) (findings and 
conclusions premised on trial court review of interrogation 
transcript are reviewed under correction of error standard). 
Preserved below by Objection to Imposition of Gang 
Enhancement [] Penalties and Motion to Strike Gang Enhancement 
Statute, R. 690-700; 866. 
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2. Whether the gang enhancement of § 76-3-203.1 
defines a separate offense subject to the panoply of protections 
accorded criminal defendants? 
Standard of review. Questions of statutory and 
constitutional construction are issues of law reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993), 
State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1991). 
Preserved below by Objection to Imposition of Gang 
Enhancement [] Penalties and Motion to Strike Gang Enhancement 
Statute, R. 690-700. 
3. Whether the gang enhancement is unconstitutional 
as violative of article I, sections 7 and 24, and the federal 
equal protection clause because it fails to meet its legislative 
purpose in a rational, narrowly drawn manner? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's conclusion that a 
statute is constitutional presents a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991) . 
Preserved below by Objection to Imposition of Gang 
Enhancement [] Penalties and Motion to Strike Gang Enhancement 
Statute, R. 690-700. 
4. Whether the gang enhancement is void for 
vagueness? 
7 
Standard of review. A trial court's conclusion that 
a statute is constitutional presents a question of law reviewed 
for correctness. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). 
Preserved below by Objection to Imposition of Gang 
Enhancement [] Penalties and Motion to Strike Gang Enhancement 
Statute, R. 690-700. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Troy Labrum and co-defendant David Mills were charged 
in an amended information (R. 7-9) with attempted murder stemming 
from a drive-by shooting at 2100 South and 700 East on September 
20, 1992. The information indicated the State's intention to 
seek a firearm enhancement (Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1995))1 
and a "gang" enhancement (Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995). A 
third defendant, Joshua Behunin was handled through the juvenile 
system. 
Jury trial was held February 16-18 before Senior Judge 
Jay E. Banks. See transcripts, R. 97-279 (2/16/93), 280-485 
(2/17/93), and 486-627 (2/18/93). Mr. Labrum and his codefendant 
were convicted. R. 49 (verdict), 615-6 (verdict read by clerk on 
the record). 
Mr. Labrum was sentenced by Judge Banks on March 22, 
1993, to a term of 1 to 15 years, to run consecutively with the 6 
year gang enhancement and 5 year firearm enhancement. R. 80. 
1This enhancement was enlarged to a "dangerous weapon" 
enhancement in 1995. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1996). 
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This Court affirmed the conviction, but clarified that Mr. 
Labrum's sentence was a gang enhanced 6 to 15 year sentence with 
a consecutive 1 to 5 year firearm enhancement. State v. Labrum, 
881 P.2d 900, 902 n.4 (Utah App. 1994), cert, granted, 892 P.2d 
13 (Utah 1995). 
On certiorari review, the Supreme Court reversed and 
held that it was plain error for the trial court not to enter 
written findings concerning imposition of the gang enhancement as 
required by § 76-3-203.1(5)(c). State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937 
(Utah 1996). On remand, the Honorable Anne M. Stirba found the 
gang enhancement to be constitutional. R. 879-880. Judge Stirba 
further found that sufficient evidence supported the reimposition 
of the gang enhancement, and that application of the enhancement 
to Mr. Labrum was appropriate. R. 878-9, 880; 839-42 (Court 
Order for Gang Enhancement, attached as addendum A). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following is all the evidence relevant to the back 
seat passenger's mental state at the time of the shooting: 
Wilmer Weffer, a back seat passenger of the victim 
vehicle (R. 164), testified that the three occupants of the 
shooter's vehicle stared at him. R. 166. He also testified that 
the front seat passenger in the shooter's car flashed gang signs. 
R. 167-8, 194. While front seat passenger Danny Owen did not 
actually see any gang signs, R. 215, 218, he overheard someone 
say that they saw gang signs, R. 2 05. Back seat passenger 
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Daniel Suluai thinks Wilmer may have seen gang signs, and that 
Wilmer might have "flipped them off." R. 247. At the 
intersection of 21st South and 7th East, the shooter's car pulled 
to the right side of the victims' vehicle and the front seat 
passenger fired a handgun over the roof of the car at the 
victims' vehicle. R. 169-70. Danny Owen identified Joshua 
Behunin as the backseat passenger of the vehicle from which Mr. 
Labrum allegedly fired the shots. R. 211. 
Nineteen year old Kevin McCray testified as to 
conversations he overheard both prior to and the day after the 
shooting: 
Q Do you recall, was there a period of time in 
the fall of last year where you were living with 
[Troy], living together? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q Do you remember where you were living at the 
time? 
A In West Valley on 2995 South. I'm not sure 
what West. 
Q Who else was living at that address? 
A Joe Kelly, Josh Behunin, and I'm not sure who 
else. 
Q Was there any adult living at that address? 
A Just Joe Kelly? 
Q Joe Kelly? 
A Yes. 
Q Troy, how long had he been living at that 
address? 
A A month. 
Q So he wasn't living at home with his parents 
at the time? 
A No, he wasn't. 
Q Are you also familiar with David Mills? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q How long have you known him? 
A Approximately four or five months. 
MR. JONES: Can we stipulate to 
identification. 
MR. Xaiz: We'll stipulate to the 
identification. 
THE COURT: He is identified by stipulation. 
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Q Was he also living at that address? 
A No, he wasn't. 
Q He was living some place else? 
A I'm not sure where. 
Q Let me direct your attention then to the 20th 
of September of '92 about 11 o'clock in the morning. 
Do you remember being at that address at that time? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q And do you remember who else was present at 
the address? 
A Joe Kelly was present, Troy Labrum was 
present, David Mills and Josh Behunin. 
Q And yourself? 
A And myself. 
Q And do you remember at that time there being 
or overhearing a conversation between Mr. Mills and Mr. 
Labrum? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Do you remember what was said at that time? 
A David Mills was asking Joe Kelly if he could 
borrow the car for the day. And Troy Labrum come in 
and they were talking about borrowing the car. And 
they said they wanted to go shoot somebody. 
Q Who made the comment about shooting someone? 
A Troy Labrum. 
Q Troy Labrum made the statement. Where was 
Mr. Mills when the comment was made? 
A He was standing next to him. 
Q And who was it that had requested of Joseph 
Kelly to borrow the car? 
A It was both David Mills and Troy Labrum. 
Q And they both asked to borrow the car? 
A Yes. 
Q How close were you when this conversation was 
taking place? 
A No more than ten feet. 
Q And you mentioned that Joshua Behunin was 
there, too. 
A Yes, he was. 
Q Where was he at the time of the conversation? 
A Standing somewhere in the kitchen. He wasn't 
in plain sight, but I did see him. 
Q How far away would he have been. 
A Fifteen or 20 feet. 
Q Was there anything else that you recall being 
said at that time? 
A I believe that was it, just them asking for 
the car and going to shoot somebody. 
Q Did you overhear anything about the details 
of the shooting, why or how? 
A No, I didn't. 
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Q Did there come a point in time then when 
these people left the home? 
A Yes. 
Q When was that in relationship to this 
conversation? 
A It was about an hour and a half later. 
Q So you recall the statement being made about 
11 o'clock? 
A Yes. 
Q And so then an hour and a half goes by until 
they leave? 
A Yes. 
Q And do you recall who left? 
A Troy Labrum, David Mills and Josh Behunin. 
Q Did you see [Troy] again the next day? Now 
we are talking about Monday, the 21st of September. 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Where would you have seen him on that day? 
A I seen Troy Labrum and Josh Behunin in my 
bedroom. They were showing me a newspaper article 
about the drive-by shooting they did the [d]ay before. 
Q What do you recall about the article? 
A It just says there was a shooting on 21st 
South and 7th East. And that's mostly what I remember 
about it. 
Q And was Mr. Mills there at the time? 
A No, he wasn't. 
Q So it was just Mr. Labrum and Mr. Behunin? 
A Yes. 
Q And what do you recall being said at that 
time concerning the newspaper article? 
A Well, Troy was bragging about that they were 
the ones that did it. These are the people we shot. 
Q Do you recall, were those his exact words? 
A He said, [M]This is what we did; this is the 
shooting that we did.["] 
Q Those comments c[a]me from who? 
A They come from Troy Labrum. 
Q Then did anything else happen while you were 
there? 
A Josh burnt the article on the top of a Pepsi 
can, and that was the end of it. 
Q Josh Behunin? 
A Yes. 
Q Was there any further discussion about the 
shooting? 
A No, there wasn't. 
R. 285-288; 291-292 (emphasis added). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State failed to adduce sufficient evidence that a 
third person acted in concert with Mr. Labrum and Mr. Mills. There 
is nothing to indicate that Mr. Behunin overhead Mr. Labrum and Mr. 
Mills discussing plans to shoot someone. Even if he had overheard, 
there is nothing indicating that Mr. Behunin solicited, requested, 
commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided in commission of the 
offense. The gang enhancement imposed against Mr. Labrum must be 
vacated. 
The gang enhancement is unconstitutional. Section 76-3-
203.1 defines separate offenses with the added element of "in 
concert" action with 2 or more others. In re Winship requires 
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime . . ." The complex intent questions 
underlying application of the gang enhancement are the type of 
facts most susceptible to error, and should be determined by the 
jury. The Utah legislature has exceeded the permissible bounds of 
offense definition by its attempt to characterize the "in concert" 
action as a sentencing consideration, rather than an element of the 
substantive offense. 
Under a state due process analysis, this Court should 
reject the federal test for whether a given fact is an element of 
an offense. Mullanev and Patterson are irreconcilable. The United 
States Supreme Court has adopted an overly formalistic test that 
fails to delineate between legitimate legislative adjustments and 
intolerable abuses. As a matter of state due process, any fact 
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comprising part of the prohibited conduct which results in 
additional stigma and punishment is an element of the offense, 
subject to the full panoply of protections accorded criminal 
defenses. Because the gang enhancement does not provide for a jury 
determination by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as well as a 
preliminary hearing, the statute violates due process. 
The gang enhancement violates the Uniform Operation of 
Laws provision of article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
Legislative history makes clear that the gang enhancement was 
drafted to target members of criminal street gangs. The gang 
enhancement does not have a reasonable tendency to further the 
objectives of the statute -- it fails to differentiate between 
actual gang members and nonmembers. The relationship of this 
classification to the statutory objectives is unreasonable and 
fanciful. The legislature left proper application of the statute 
to the discretion of sentencing judges, who, unguided by any 
statutory criteria, are misapplying the law to non-gangmembers. 
The statute violates article I, section 24. 
The gang enhancement violates state due process because 
application of the statute is arbitrary and capricious. While the 
purpose of the statute is to curb criminal street gangs and their 
criminal activities, the statute fails to address this concern in 
a rational manner. Non-gangmembers are swept up and made subject 
to the enhancement, despite the fact that this does nothing to 
further the goals of the legislation. 
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Federal equal protection is violated by the statute. 
Because the statute affects fundamental constitutional rights to a 
preliminary hearing, trial by jury, and proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, heightened scrutiny applies. The enhancement statute fails 
the strict scrutiny test, and is not narrowly tailored to effect 
its purpose. 
The gang enhancement statute is void for vagueness. It 
impinges on protected association rights, and fails to adequately 
define the scope of its application. The statute contains no 
guidelines to constrain the discretion of the judiciary. As a 
result, the enhancement is being applied to non-gangmembers who 
were never intended by the legislature to receive enhanced 
sentences under the statute. 
This Court should declare the gang enhancement statute 
unconstitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE 
BACK SEAT PASSENGER POSSESSED A CRIMINAL MENS 
REA TO SUPPORT APPLICATION OF THE GANG 
ENHANCEMENT HERE. 
Judge Stirba premised her findings supporting imposition 
of the gang enhancement on her review of the trial transcript.2 R. 
839. The gang enhancement, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995), 
provides for an increased minimum term when an offense is committed 
"in concert with two or more persons," defined as meaning that "the 
2Senior Judge Jay E. Banks presided at trial and the initial 
sentencing. 
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defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable 
for the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-203.1 (1) (b) . Section 76-2-202 provides: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for 
the commission of an offense who directly commits the 
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct 
which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such conduct. 
Fully marshalled, the facts having any bearing on Joshua Behunin's 
mental state are insufficient to establish that he would be 
criminally liable under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202. 
The trial court relied on a conversation between Mr. 
Labrum and codefendant David Mills. Finding 1, R. 83 9. Nineteen 
year old Kevin McCray testified as follows: 
Q Do you recall, was there a period of time in 
the fall of last year where you were living with [Troy] , 
living together? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q Do you remember where you were living at the 
time? 
A In West Valley on 2995 South. I'm not sure 
what West. 
Q Who else was living at that address? 
A Joe Kelly, Josh Behunin, and I'm not sure who 
else. 
Q Was there any adult living at that address? 
A Just Joe Kelly? 
Q Joe Kelly? 
A Yes. 
Q Troy, how long had he been living at that 
address? 
A A month. 
Q So he wasn't living at home with his parents at 
the time? 
A No, he wasn't. 
Q Are you also familiar with David Mills? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q How long have you known him? 
A Approximately four or five months. 
MR. JONES: Can we stipulate to identification. 
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MR. Xaiz: We'll stipulate to the 
identification. 
THE COURT: He is identified by stipulation. 
Q Was he also living at that address? 
A No, he wasn't. 
Q He was living some place else? 
A I'm not sure where. 
Q Let me direct your attention then to the 20th 
of September of '92 about 11 o'clock in the morning. Do 
you remember being at that address at that time? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q And do you remember who else was present at the 
address? 
A Joe Kelly was present, Troy Labrum was present, 
David Mills and Josh Behunin. 
Q And yourself? 
A And myself. 
Q And do you remember at that time there being or 
overhearing a conversation between Mr. Mills and Mr. 
Labrum ? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Do you remember what was said at that time? 
A David Mills was asking Joe Kelly if he could 
borrow the car for the day. And Troy Labrum come in and 
they were talking about borrowing the car. And they said 
they wanted to go shoot somebody. 
Q Who made the comment about shooting someone? 
A Troy Labrum. 
Q Troy Labrum made the statement. Where was Mr. 
Mills when the comment was made? 
A He was standing next to him. 
Q And who was it that had requested of Joseph 
Kelly to borrow the car? 
A It was both David Mills and Troy Labrum. 
Q And they both asked to borrow the car? 
A Yes. 
Q How close were you when this conversation was 
taking place? 
A No more than ten feet. 
Q And you mentioned that Joshua Behunin was 
there, too. 
A Yes, he was. 
Q Where was he at the time of the conversation? 
A Standing somewhere in the kitchen. He wasn't 
in plain sight, but I did see him. 
Q How far away would he have been. 
A Fifteen or 20 feet. 
Q Was there anything else that you recall being 
said at that time? 
A I believe that was it, just them asking for the 
car and going to shoot somebody. 
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Q Did you overhear anything about the details of 
the shooting, why or how? 
A No, I didn't. 
Q Did there come a point in time then when these 
people left the home? 
A Yes. 
Q When was that in relationship to this 
conversation? 
A It was about an hour and a half later. 
Q So you recall the statement being made about 11 
o'clock? 
A Yes. 
Q And so then an hour and a half goes by until 
they leave? 
A Yes. 
Q And do you recall who left? 
A Troy Labrum, David Mills and Josh Behunin. 
R. 285-288 (emphasis added). 
This testimony fails to establish Mr. Behunin's mental 
state. While he was in the house at the time of the conversation 
between Messrs. Labrum and Mills about shooting someone, he was 15 
to 20 feet away, in the kitchen, and not "in plain sight." There 
was no testimony concerning the loudness or quietness of the 
conversation. From the record, it is impossible to tell if Mr. 
Behunin was physically capable of even hearing the conversation 
from his distance of 15 to 20 feet away. There is nothing to 
indicate what Mr. Behunin was doing at the time, or that Mr. 
Behunin in fact heard the conversation. 
Finding 2 states that Behunin left with Mills and Labrum 
as the back seat passenger. The fact that some one and a half 
hours later Mr. Behunin left with Mr. Labrum and Mr. Mills says 
nothing about his mental state. If he was unaware that they 
intended to shoot someone, he cannot be said to be soliciting, 
requesting, commanding, encouraging, or intentionally aiding them. 
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Even if he was aware of their plan, sitting passively in the 
backseat does not constitute solicitation, encouragement, or aid in 
any fashion. 
Findings 3 through 5 are that the victims were followed 
for several blocks prior to the shooting "flashed gang signs," and 
stared at the victims (R. 168) . None of this conduct is criminal. 
None evidences that Joshua Behunin was aware that Mr. Labrum 
intended to shoot anyone, or that he solicited, encouraged, or 
aided that activity. 
Finally, the trial court relied on a conversation the 
following day. Findings 8, 9. Kevin McCray testified: 
Q Did you see [Troy] again the next day? Now we 
are talking about Monday, the 21st of September. 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Where would you have seen him on that day? 
A I seen Troy Labrum and Josh Behunin in my 
bedroom. They were showing me a newspaper article about 
the drive-by shooting they did the [d]ay before. 
Q What do you recall about the article? 
A It just says there was a shooting on 21st South 
and 7th East. And that's mostly what I remember about 
it. 
Q And was Mr. Mills there at the time? 
A No, he wasn't. 
Q So it was just Mr. Labrum and Mr. Behunin? 
A Yes. 
Q And what do you recall being said at that time 
concerning the newspaper article? 
A Well, Troy was bragging about that they were 
the ones that did it. These are the people we shot. 
Q Do you recall, were those his exact words? 
A He said, ["]This is what we did; this is the 
shooting that we did.["] 
Q Those comments c[a]me from who? 
A They come from Troy Labrum. 
Q Then did anything else happen while you were 
there? 
A Josh burnt the article on the top of a Pepsi 
can, and that was the end of it. 
Q Josh Behunin? 
A Yes. 
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Q Was there any further discussion about the 
shooting? 
A No, there wasn't. 
R. 291-292 (emphasis added). 
This evidence likewise says nothing about Mr. Behunin's 
mental state the day before. Mr. Behunin said nothing. The "we" 
Mr. Labrum refers to could be Mr. Labrum and Mr. Mills, rather than 
Mr. Labrum and Mr. Behunin. Mr. Behunin's actions in burning the 
article are at best ambiguous, and are more consistent with 
feelings of disgust than participation and pride. In total, there 
is no convincing evidence that Joshua Behunin was aware of the plan 
to shoot someone. His actions in riding in the back seat are not 
a solicitation, request, command, encouragement, or aid in the 
commission of the offense. Even if Mr. Behunin flashed gang signs 
(and the evidence does not establish that he did) , this is neither 
illegal nor a solicitation to commit attempted homicide. 
While the evidence establishes that Mr. Labrum and Mr. 
Mills participated in the shooting, it fails to establish that Mr. 
Behunin was anything other than a passive observer. "Mere 
presence, or even prior knowledge, does not make one an accomplice 
when he neither advises, instigates, encourages, or assists in 
perpetration of the crime." State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1166 
(Utah 1980) (citing State v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662 (Utah 1972)); 
accord State v. Fertig, 233 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah 1951) ("Mere 
presence combined with knowledge that a crime is about to be 
committed or a mental approbation while the will contributes 
nothing to the doing of the act, will not of itself constitute one 
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an accomplice."). See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 
S.Ct. 338, 342, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (A "person's mere propinquity 
to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, 
without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person."), 
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 
357 (1979) (mere presence in a neighborhood frequented by drug 
users does not give rise to reasonable suspicion); United States 
v. Pi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593, 68 S.Ct. 222, 228, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) 
("Presumptions of guilt are not lightly to be indulged from mere 
meetings."); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991) (no 
reasonable suspicion where man walking near defendant had run 
away). 
The State has proved nothing more than mere presence 
here. The factual predicate for imposition of the gang enhancement 
was not established. The gang enhancement should be vacated. 
POINT II. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT DEFINES A SEPARATE 
OFFENSE SUBJECT TO ALL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTIONS ACCORDED CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the 
sixth amendment to the federal constitution guarantee defendants 
the right to a jury trial. A jury, rather than the trial court, 
should make the factual findings concerning the applicability of 
the gang enhancement. Under article I, section 7 and the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments, defendants have a due process right to be 
presumed innocent until the elements of an offense are proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Article I, section 13 guarantees the 
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right to a preliminary hearing to establish probable cause on all 
elements of an offense prior to being bound over for trial. 
The gang enhancement statute states that "[t]his section 
does not create any separate offense but provides an enhanced 
penalty for the primary offense." The legislature is elevating 
form over substance -- in fact a new offense, with an additional 
element, has been created. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1995) 
defines elements of criminal offenses as the conjunction of " [tjhe 
conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed, 
prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense" and 
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 [t]he culpable mental state required." The conduct proscribed in 
the gang enhancement satisfies both prongs of this element test. 
"In concert" describes both the proscribed conduct and attendant 
circumstances of the offense. The mental state of the primary 
offense likewise must be shown.3 The gang enhancement statute is 
not an enhancement at all; it defines new offenses with the added 
element of "in concert with two or more persons." 
A. THE LEGISLATURE'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE 
"IN CONCERT" ELEMENT AS A SENTENCING 
CONSIDERATION IMPERMISSIBLY DENIGRATES 
THE INTERESTS FOUND CRITICAL IN WINSHIP, 
AND VIOLATES FEDERAL DUE PROCESS. 
3The additional intent to commit the crime "in concert" must 
also be shown. Otherwise, defendants could be held criminally 
responsible for conduct of others over whom the defendant has no 
control. For example, a person who slashes the tires of a car 
should not receive a greater sentence for his or her criminal 
mischief if two unrelated bystanders decide on the spur of the 
moment that they want to break out the windows of the same car. 
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In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, , 25 
L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970) definitively held that "the Due Process 
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which he is charged." In Mullanev v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 
684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) the court held it was 
impermissible for the State of Maine to require a defendant to 
prove by a preponderance that he acted in the heat of passion to 
reduce his conviction from murder to manslaughter: 
[I]f Winship were limited to those facts that constitute 
a crime as defined by state law, a State could undermine 
many of the interests that decision sought to protect 
without effecting any substantive change in its law. It 
would only be necessary to redefine the elements that 
constitute different crimes, characterizing them as 
factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment. 
Mullanev, 421 U.S. at 698. 
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 
91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), the court upheld a Pennsylvania scheme 
whereby a 5 year mandatory minimum sentence is imposed if the trial 
judge finds by a preponderance that the defendant visibly possessed 
a firearm during the commission of the offense. The court noted 
that there is little risk of error in the trial court making such 
a determination. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84. The court reiterated 
that there are constitutional limits to a State's power to redefine 
crimes in circumvention of Winship, but declined to specify the 
precise confines of those limits. Id. at 86-7. However, the 
court noted, "[t]he statute gives no impression of having been 
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tailored to permit the visible possession finding to be a tail 
which wags the dog of the substantive offense." Id. at 88. 
While the "tail wagging the dog" metaphor used by the 
Supreme Court is admittedly imprecise, the sense of what is meant 
is clear. Sentencing considerations must involve additional facts 
which are few in number, capable of easy determination, and not 
subject to any appreciable risk of error in their determination. 
The gang enhancement statute exceeds the permissible 
limits of offense definition allowed by the due process clause, and 
should be stricken as violative of the due process clause. 
1. The "in concert" finding involves 
complicated evaluation of the mental 
state of other actors, and is highly 
susceptible to error. 
Unlike the "visible possession" finding at issue in 
McMillan, the "in concert" finding here involves complicated 
determinations of the intent of other individuals, who need not be 
apprehended or even identified. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5) (b) . 
Prior history in this case reveals the problems inherent in having 
the sentencing judge make the "in concert" determination. In 
Labrum I, this Court observed: 
[T]here is nothing in the record indicating whether the 
trial court actually found that Joshua Behunin, the back-
seat passenger in the assailants' car, acted as an 
accomplice in the shooting. Therefore, we are unable to 
implicitly conclude that the trial court made the correct 
factual findings and properly applied the governing rules 
of law to those findings. 
State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 905 (Utah App. 1994) . 
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One of the motivating concerns in Winship was the need 
for accurate fact determinations in criminal cases. 397 U.S. at 
363. The gang enhancement statute undermines this paramount goal 
and invites perfunctory application of the enhancement without the 
careful, considered fact-finding it properly warrants. 
For action in concert, "the following three elements must 
exist: (1) A concert of action; (2) a unity of purpose or design; 
(3) two or more defendants working separately but to a common 
purpose and each acting with the knowledge and consent of the 
others." Elliott v. Barnes, 645 P.2d 1136, 1137 (Wash. App. 1982). 
Accord Gilbert H. Moen Company v. Island Steel Erectors, Inc., 878 
P.2d 1246, 1249 (Wash. App. 1994) (in concert action requires that 
the "actors consciously act together in an unlawful manner"). The 
risk of erroneous fact-finding takes the "in concert" element 
outside the realm of otherwise permissible sentencing 
considerations, and mandates that the enhancement not be applied 
absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
2. The statute here is tailored such 
that the "in concert" finding falls 
outside the permissible limits of 
offense definition set forth in 
McMillan. 
Proof of "in concert" activity requires proof that two 
other actors committed a crime in conjunction with the primary 
offense. The enhancement is only applicable if each additional 
actor "commits the offense, solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
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conduct which constitutes an offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 
(1995), as applicable through § 76-3-203.1(1) (b) . 
Of the three (or more) criminal actors, the State is only 
required to prove to the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one 
is guilty. The enhancement statute attempts to transform proof 
that the other two (or more) are culpable into a sentencing 
function. Two thirds of the required facts are relegated to the 
sentencing court's perfunctory determination that the enhancement 
is applicable. Only one third of the necessary facts are proven to 
the jury.4 The statute here falls outside the rule of McMillan, 
and must be stricken. The State has exceeded the permissible 
bounds of offense definition. The enhancement statute 
impermissibly relieves the State of its burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt in violation of the federal due process clause. 
B. UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, "IN CONCERT" 
ACTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AN ELEMENT 
THAT MUST BE PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT TO A JURY. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not hesitated to depart from 
federal standards when those standards become unworkable.5 Current 
4Expressed in terms of the metaphor used in McMillan, the tail 
here (the finding that two others are criminally responsible) is 
twice as large as the rest of the dog (the finding of criminal 
responsibility of the primary actor), and wags the dog. 
5E.g. , State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991) 
(rejecting some aspects of federal model for analyzing eyewitness 
identifications); Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 
(Utah 1991) (recognizing due process rights in parole hearings); 
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 417-8 (Utah 1991) (rejecting 
federal doctrine that bank depositors have no expectation of 
privacy in bank records); see also State v. Hygh, 711 P. 2d 264, 
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federal law addressing offense definition and what constitutes an 
element of a given offense has become unworkable and should be 
rejected. 
1. Current federal standards governing 
offense definition and what 
constitutes an element are 
unworkable. 
In Mullanev v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 
L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), the Supreme Court struck down a Maine statute 
providing that malice aforethought would be presumed and an 
intentional and unlawful homicide is murder unless the defendant 
proved by a preponderance that he acted in the heat of passion on 
sudden provocation. The Court conducted an historical review of 
murder and manslaughter and observed: 
First, the fact at issue here -- the presence or absence 
of heat of passion on sudden provocation -- has been, 
almost from the inception of the common law of homicide, 
the single most important factor in determining the 
degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide. 
And, second, the clear trend has been toward requiring 
the prosecution to bear the ultimate burden of proving 
this fact. 
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 696. The court concluded that "By drawing 
this distinction [between murder and manslaughter] , while refusing 
to require the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
the fact upon which it turns, Maine denigrates the interests found 
271-2 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring, noting federal law 
had become a "labyrinth of rules built upon a series of 
contradictory and confusing rationalizations and distinctions," and 
advocating separate state constitutional construction). 
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critical in Winship. " Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698. A unanimous 
court reversed. 
In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 53 
L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), five members of the Court reached a result 
directly contrary to that in Mullaney. The New York statute at 
issue required the defendant to prove the affirmative defense of 
extreme emotional disturbance by a preponderance to reduce a second 
degree murder charge to manslaughter. The Court characterized the 
defense as "a considerably expanded version of the common-law 
defense of heat of passion on sudden provocation . . . " Patterson, 
432 U.S. at 202. The Court further characterized the definition of 
murder at issue in Mullaney as including the absence of 
provocation. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 215-6. 
The dissent took the majority to task over the 
inconsistency with Mullaney: 
The Court manages to run a constitutional boundary line 
through the barely visible space that separates Maine's 
law from New York's. It does so on the basis of 
distinctions in language that are formalistic rather than 
substantive. 
. . . Winship was violated [in Mullaney] only 
because this fact -- malice -- was "presumed" unless the 
defendant persuaded the jury otherwise by showing that he 
acted in the heat of passion." New York, in form 
presuming no affirmative fact against Patterson, [] and 
blessed with a statute drafted in the leaner language of 
the 20th century, escapes constitutional scrutiny 
unscathed even though the effect on the defendant of New 
York's placement of the burden of persuasion is exactly 
the same as Maine's. . . . 
With all respect, this type of constitutional 
adjudication is indefensibly formalistic. A limited but 
significant check on possible abuses in the criminal law 
now becomes an exercise in arid formalities. What 
Winship and Mullaney had sought to teach about the limits 
a free society places on its procedures to safeguard the 
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liberty of its citizens becomes a rather simplistic 
lesson in statutory draftsmanship. 
. . . This decision simply leaves us without 
a conceptual framework for distinguishing abuses from 
legitimate legislative adjustments of the burden of 
persuasion in criminal cases. [] 
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 221-5 (Powell, J., joined by Brennan and 
Marshall, JJ., dissenting). The practical results of the Mullaney 
and Patterson decisions cannot be reconciled. Fundamental 
constitutional protections are now relegated under federal due 
process to the vagaries of draftsmanship in the state legislatures. 
The federal test should be rejected. 
2. This Court should define crime 
elements as any fact comprising part 
of the prohibited conduct which 
results in additional stigma and 
punishment. 
In dissent from McMillan, Justice Stevens sets forth a 
practical and workable test: 
Once a State defines a criminal offense, the 
Due Process Clause requires it to prove any component of 
the prohibited transaction that gives rise to both a 
special stigma and a special punishment beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J. dissenting6). Under article 
I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution, this Court should follow 
this straightforward test. The conduct of the other actors should 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before the gang enhancement is 
applicable. 
6Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, dissenting, join in 
this aspect of Justice Stevens' dissent. 477 U.S. at 94. 
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Oregon has followed this approach. In State v. Wedge, 
652 P.2d 773 (Or. 1982), the Oregon Supreme Court stated that 
"facts which constitute the crime are for the jury and those which 
characterize the defendant are for the sentencing judge." 652 P. 2d 
at 777. Wedge involved a sentencing enhancement for use of a 
firearm in the commission of an offense. The Oregon court found: 
Although the challenged statute is denominated 
an enhanced penalty statute, in effect it creates a new 
crime. The jury only considered evidence offered on the 
question of first degree robbery, and convicted him of 
that offense, but the defendant was sentenced on the 
basis of having been found guilty of the crime of "first 
degree robbery using a firearm." If the legislature had 
actually described the crime as "first degree robbery 
using a firearm" the use of the firearm would certainly 
be an element and there would be no doubt defendant would 
have a right to a jury determination of guilt. The 
legislature cannot eliminate constitutional protections 
by separating and relabeling elements of a crime. 
Wedge, 652 P.2d at 778. 
Arizona likewise has drawn distinctions based on whether 
the enhancing factor under consideration involves additional 
elements of culpability or merely concerns a status. In State v. 
Hurley, 741 P.2d 257, 263 (Ariz. 1987) the Arizona court rejected 
the contention that an enhancement based on release status required 
a jury determination by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Parole 
status has traditionally been a factor considered in sentencing, 
has never been an element of a crime in Arizona, and involved no 
determination of the conduct or mental state of the defendant. 
Proof involves objective evidence with little risk of error. 
However, in State v. Powers, 742 P.2d 792 (Ariz. 1987), the court 
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found that the same enhancement based on escape status required a 
jury determination: 
Thus, unlike the release status considered in 
Hurley, escape is a crime in itself. The crime of escape 
contains its own elements: the state must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the 
requisite intent to escape. In this case, Powers is 
receiving additional punishment based on alleged criminal 
conduct -- escape -- for which no jury has found him 
guilty. 
Powers, 742 P.2d at 795. 
Powers highlights the differences between the Utah 
statute and the California statute on which it was based. The 
California statute creates a new substantive crime of "a felony 
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in 
association with any criminal street gang." Cal. Penal Code § 
186.22(b)(1). Utah avoided the statutory definition of a new 
offense, but the practical effect is the same: the Utah statute 
defines new offenses. 
Requiring a jury determination of the "in concert" 
element would bring this area of law into accord with similar 
provisions in Utah. Utah law provides for a jury determination by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt for both the dangerous weapon 
enhancement (Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1995)) and under the 
habitual criminal statutes (Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 et seq. 
(1995)) . Under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (providing for enhanced 
penalties for drug offenses within 1000 feet of schools, churches, 
parks, and the like), that the activity occurred within 1000 feet 
is an element of the crime that must be found by the jury. State 
v. Powasnik, 918 P. 2d 146 (Utah App. 1996) (" [T] oday we explicitly 
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announce the penalty enhancement statute adds an extra element to 
those drug offenses that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
to the same trier of fact who decides the predicate offense.") . In 
capital cases, aggravating circumstances must be proved to the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tillman, 750 P. 2d 546, 577-80, 
585-88, 591 (Utah 1987) (Stewart, Durham, and Zimmerman, JJ., in 
separate opinions, collectively holding that aggravating 
circumstances are elements of the crime which the jury must 
unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt). The gang enhancement 
serves identical purposes; the same protections should apply. 
Additionally, defendants should be entitled to a preliminary 
hearing addressing the "in concert" activity under article I, 
section 13 of the Utah Constitution. 
This Court should follow the element test set forth in 
Justice Steven's dissent in Patterson: any fact comprising part of 
the prohibited conduct which results in additional stigma and 
punishment is an element of the offense.7 This accords with 
practice in Oregon under Wedge and Arizona under Powers. 
Under this test, the gang enhancement is unconstitutional 
as it violates article I, sections 7, 12, and 13 of the Utah 
7Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (2) (a) requires no less. It 
provides: 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the 
offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or 
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or 
forbidden in the definition of the offense; 
The gang enhancement proscribes specified conduct and attendant 
circumstances; "in concert" activity is thus an element. 
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Constitution. Fundamental to Utah's criminal jurisprudence is the 
proposition that a person is presumed innocent "until each element 
of the offense" charged against him is proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1995) (emphasis added); accord 
State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981); State v. Torres, 619 
P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980); State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 n.5 
(Utah 1980); State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466, 468-69 (Utah App. 
1988). By failing to require proof beyond a reasonable, the gang 
enhancement violates article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
Article I, section 12, as well as the sixth amendment,8 
guarantees the right to jury trial. It is well established that 
the jury is provided with the sole ability to judge the facts in 
criminal matters and to weigh the evidence. The law prohibits the 
judge from invading that province. State v. Green, 6 P. 2d 177, 181 
(Utah 1931); State v. Diaz, 290 P. 727, 731 (Utah 1930); State v. 
Bruno, 256 P. 109, 110 (Utah 1927); State v. Greene, 94 P. 987, 989 
(Utah 1908); State v. James, 89 P. 460, 463 (Utah 1907); People v. 
Biddlecome, 2 P. 194 (Utah 1882). The gang enhancement violates 
article I, section 12 by providing that the trial court, rather 
than a jury, is to determine whether the crime was committed in 
concert with two or more others. 
Article I, section 13 guarantees defendants a preliminary 
hearing on all offenses. The gang enhancement statute, by 
designating itself an enhancement rather than a substantive 
8Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 
491 (1968) (states may not abridge federal right to trial by jury 
in criminal matters). 
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offense, deprives defendants of preliminary hearings on the issue 
of whether there is probable cause that the crime was committed in 
concert with two or more others. The accused's right to a 
preliminary hearing is a substantial one. State v. Pay, 146 P. 
3 00 (Utah 1915). The Supreme Court has ruled that unless a criminal 
defendant is subjected to a preliminary examination for the 
violation of a criminal statute, the prosecution is not authorized 
to continue with a proceeding relating to the violation. State v. 
Jensen, 136 P.2d 949, 951-52 (Utah 1943) ; State v. Freeman, 71 P.2d 
196, 199 (Utah 1937); State v. Nelson, 176 P. 860, 861 (Utah 1918). 
The gang enhancement violates article I, section 13 by eliminating 
this fundamental right to a preliminary hearing. 
The legislature's declaration in § 76-3-203.1 (5) (a) 
notwithstanding, the gang enhancement creates a separate offense by 
proscribing conduct and attendant circumstances. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-501(2) . The constitutional protections applicable to elements 
of criminal offenses, including the presumption of innocence, 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, right to an 
impartial jury, and right to a preliminary hearing, must be applied 
to the "in concert" element of the gang enhancement. The gang 
enhancement statute is unconstitutional. 
POINT III. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT VIOLATES STATE DUE 
PROCESS, UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS, AND 
FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION BECAUSE IT FAILS TO 
MEET ITS LEGISLATIVE GOALS IN A REASONABLE 
MANNER. 
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Under article I, sections 7 and 24 of the Utah 
Constitution, and the fourteenth amendment of the United States 
Constitution, the gang enhancement is unconstitutional. 
A, UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 THE STATUTE 
FAILS TO HAVE A REASONABLE TENDENCY TO 
FURTHER ITS OBJECTIVES, AND THE 
CLASSIFICATION IS UNREASONABLE AND 
FANCIFUL. 
The gang enhancement fails the uniform operation of laws 
test: 
Article I, § 24 protects against two types of 
discrimination. First, a law must apply equally to all 
persons within a class. [cites omitted] Second, the 
statutory classifications and the different treatment 
given the classes must be based on differences that have 
a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the 
statute. [cites omitted] If the relationship of the 
classification to the statutory objectives is 
unreasonable or fanciful, the discrimination is 
unreasonable* [cite omitted] 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670-71 (Utah 1984) (declaring Utah 
guest statute unconstitutional because the classification does not 
have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the 
statute) (emphasis added); accord Greenwood v. City of N. Salt 
lake, 817 P.2d 816, 820 (Utah 1991); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. Salt 
Lake City, 752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 1988); see also McLaughlin v. 
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191, 85 S.Ct. 283, , 13 L.Ed.2d 222, 228 
(1964) ("Judicial inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause, 
therefore, does not end with a showing of equal application among 
the members of the class defined by the legislation. The courts 
must reach and determine the question whether the classifications 
drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose . . .") . 
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State uniform operation analysis is more rigorous than 
and will always meet or exceed the federal "rational basis" 
standard. State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 467 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); Greenwood v. City of N. Salt 
Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 820 (Utah 1991); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 1988); Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989). 
The gang enhancement statute does not have a reasonable 
tendency to further its legislative objectives. Given the purpose 
of the legislation, the classifications drawn in the statute are 
unreasonable. The gang enhancement is unconstitutional. 
1. Legislative history indicates that 
the gang enhancement was enacted to 
target members of criminal street 
gangs. 
The gang enhancement statute does not list its 
legislative objectives on its face. The legislative history, 
attached as addendum B, however, is abundantly clear: 
[Bill sponsor Rep. Rushton:] Senate Bill 52 is what's 
ended up after a lot of research this summer on the 
street gang problems . . . 
Id. at 1. 
[P]olice departments estimate that in the Salt Lake 
valley now there are six hundred plus members . . . of 
these California style street gangs. Of that six 
hundred, it is estimated that a hardened criminal core of 
the gangs, . . . it is estimated about three percent of 
this group are hardened criminals with associations with 
the street gangs in Los Angeles. . . . Ah, Senator 
Fordham and myself bee[a]me alarmed about this in about 
July of last year. We inquired of the Los Angeles County 
Attorney's Office on what was being done to prevent 
street gangs in there, they told us about a piece of 
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legislation in California called "The Street Terrorism 
Prevention Act." We brought a copy of that act to Utah, 
But since that time, that act has run into 
constitutional problems in California, so the 
Statewide Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, in 
conjunction with the Chief Police Association, came up 
with this bill, the group criminal activities penalty, 
which they feel confident avoids the constitutional 
problems of the California Street Terrorism Act and will 
be a useful tool. It doesn't have the political or 
psychological effects that our original Street Terrorism 
[Act] had, because we used the term gang, we used the 
term street terrorism in our bill, and they told us this 
was the reason why it would become constitutionally 
unsound. 
at 2. 
It is, looks benign, "Group Criminal Activities Penalty," 
but this is in fact what the Statewide [Association] of 
Prosecuting Attorneys have asked for and want for tools 
to be used against street gang prolif [er] ation in the 
state of Utah. . . . [T] he idea behind the enhanced 
penalties in California and the idea here was to get that 
center core, that's the core group of hardened criminals 
that supplies the money, supplies the impetus for a true 
criminal street gang. . . . Ah, it gets to the hardened 
core, and the social workers tell us that the only thing 
to do with them to allow social workers to work with the 
remainder of the young people at risk in these gangs is 
to get that hardened core off the streets. The enhanced 
penalty is designed for that purpose. . . . But this 
enhanced penalty, we have got to get that hard core of 
the street gang groups off of the streets, out of the 
street gangs. 
at 3. 
This bill is directed at that core criminal element, that 
three percent of those six hundred gang members that have 
been identified that provide the father figure in these 
gangs. And they provide also the connection [with] the 
California gangs, the connection to the crack cocaine, 
the money that is fueling this explosion of gang activity 
in our cities and I'd like to ask you for your support 
for this bill and thank you for your time. 
at 7. Debate in the Senate similarly indicates that the bill 
designed to target criminal street gangs. Legislative History 
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2. The gang enhancement fails to 
effectively address the criminal 
street gang problem, and is widely 
applied to non-gangmembers. 
In the house debate, Representative Prante asked a 
question concerning the impact of the legislation on three persons 
acting in concert who were not actual gang members. He was assured 
that that potential situation was covered by the definition in §76-
2-2029 and by judicial discretion to not impose the enhancement. 
Legislative History at 6. This case presents precisely the 
situation that concerned Representative Prante. The State 
presented no evidence indicating that Mr. Labrum is a member of a 
criminal street gang. While § 76-3-203.1(6) provides judicial 
discretion to suspend imposition of the gang enhancement, it fails 
to indicate that non-membership in a criminal street gang is 
appropriate grounds for such suspension. Simply stated, the gang 
enhancement is routinely being applied to persons who are not 
criminal street gang members, contrary to the purposes of the 
statute. 
The California "Street Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention Act," enacted in 1988, is found in Cal. Penal Code § 
186.20 et seq. (Supp. 1996), attached as addendum C. Despite the 
concerns expressed by Rep. Rushton, thus far the statute has 
withstood constitutional challenge. People v. Gamez, 235 Cal. App. 
3d 957, 286 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1991); In re Alberto R. , 235 Cal. App. 
3d 1309, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348 (1991). 
9Section 76-2-202 obviously does not address the issue of gang 
membership in any fashion. 
38 
Unlike the California "Street Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention Act," the gang enhancement statute fails to meet its 
goals in a rational manner. Representative Rushton made clear that 
the act was intended to target criminal street gangs in Utah. 
Instead of being applied only to these individuals, the enhancement 
has been and continues to be widely applied to a multitude of 
individuals who do not belong to criminal street gangs. 
Rather than designating the proper targets of the 
enhancement in the statute, the legislature attempted to rely on 
judicial discretion to ensure that non-gangmembers would not be 
sentenced under the enhancement. Because the statute fails to 
delineate the proper scope of its application, judges have been 
unable to carry into effect the intent of the legislature. The 
statute fails to further the goals of the legislature in combatting 
the influx and proliferation of criminal street gangs in Utah. 
The gang enhancement, while intended to target the 
hardened core criminal element of criminal street gangs, sets apart 
a statutorily defined class of individuals who commit crimes in 
concert with 2 or more others. This group is immensely broader 
than the targeted group. The statutory classification here is not 
based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the 
objectives of the statute. Since the relationship of the 
classification to the statutory objectives is unreasonable and 
fanciful, the discrimination is unreasonable. Malan v. Lewis, 693 
P.2d 661, 670-71 (Utah 1984); Greenwood v. City of N. Salt lake, 
817 P.2d 816, 820 (Utah 1991); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 
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191, 85 S.Ct. 283, , 13 L.Ed.2d 222, 228 (1964). The gang 
enhancement should be stricken as unconstitutional. 
B. APPLICATION OF THE GANG ENHANCEMENT TO 
NON-GANGMEMBERS IS ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS. 
In State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), the 
Supreme Court struck Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-35-21.5(4) (c) and -(d) as 
violative of the due process clause: 
We believe that subsections (c) and (d) of section 77-35-
21.5(4) are not rationally related to the sentencing 
process as opposed to civil commitment. 
Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1271. Subsection (c) embodied the doctrine 
of parens patriae -- placement in the hospital for the patient's 
own best interest. In the guilty and mentally ill context, this 
doctrine is inapplicable. The question is not whether the 
defendant's liberty interest will be curtailed, but where. 
Subsection (d) concerned least restrictive alternatives, again not 
at issue where the defendant is to be incarcerated. 
Not one of the considerations in subsections (c) and (d) 
is relevant to the treatment rationale. The application 
of those provisions to a mentally ill criminal defendant 
is thus arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the due 
process guarantee of article I, section VII of the Utah 
Constitution. We therefore strike subsections (c) and 
(d) of section 77-35-21.5(4) as unconstitutional. 
Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1272. 
The "in concert" provisions of the gang enhancement are 
likewise not rationally related to the statutory purpose of curbing 
criminal street gang activity. Gang members may act individually 
or in concert, as may non-gangmembers. While the legislature had 
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a well defined group in mind when it enacted the statute, the 
statute fails to target that group exclusively. Persons who are 
not gangmembers are swept up in this overbroad attempt to curb 
criminal street gangs. The gang enhancement should be struck as 
unconstitutional in violation of article I, section 7 of the Utah 
constitution. 
C. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT STATUTE VIOLATES 
FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION. 
Under the federal scheme, if the statute deals with 
sensitive constitutional values or discriminates based on suspect 
classifications, the court will apply a heightened scrutiny of 
legislative means and ends, involving a real and thoughtful 
examination of legislative purpose and the relationship between the 
legislation and that purpose. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P. 2d 572, 582 
(Utah 1993); State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 398 (Utah 1989) (strict 
scrutiny test is used if a challenged classification is "suspect" 
or if a "fundamental interest" is involved); Condemarin v. 
University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 356, 358 (Utah 1989). I 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 affects fundamental rights 
embodied in the state and federal constitutions, including the 
right to jury trial, presumption of innocence, right to a 
preliminary hearing, and right to due process. Therefore, a strict 
scrutiny standard applies. Under the strict scrutiny standard, 
"classifications which might invade or restrain [fundamental 
rights] must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined." 
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Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670, 86 
S.Ct. 1079, , 16 L.Ed.2d 169, 174 (1966). 
The gang enhancement fails federal strict scrutiny. 
While combatting criminal street gangs is a legitimate state 
interest, the statute is not narrowly drawn towards that purpose. 
Rather than applying strictly, or even primarily, to gangmembers, 
the statute applies to non-gangmembers. Even if the scope is 
proper, the means utilized are impermissible. There is no 
persuasive, much less rational, reason why application of the 
enhancement should not be determined by a jury by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The gang enhancement violates federal equal 
protection, and should be stricken. 
POINT IV. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT IS VOID FOR 
VAGUENESS. 
Section 76-3-203.1 is void for vagueness under a federal 
due process analysis. Basic principles of due process prohibit the 
enactment of a statute if it is vague on its face. 
Vague laws offend several important values. First, 
because we assume that man is free to steer between 
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the 
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity 
to know what is prohibited, so that he may act 
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not 
providing fair warning. [] Second, if arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must 
provide explicit standards for those who apply them.n 
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters 
to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad 
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of 
arbitrary and discriminatory application. [1 Third, but 
related, where a vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive 
areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,"11 it "operates 
to inhibit the exercise of [those] f reedoms. "[] 
Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to "'steer 
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far wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than if the 
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked. "[] 
Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 
, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-28 (1972) (footnotes omitted); see also 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S. Ct. 1855, , 75 
L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983); Greenwood v. City of N. Salt Lake, 817 
P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991). 
A. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT STATUTE FAILS TO 
ADEQUATELY DEFINE WHAT IS MEANT BY "IN 
CONCERT" CONDUCT. 
Section 76-3-203.1(1)(b) provides that "'In concert with 
two or more persons' as used in this section means that the 
defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable 
for the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202." It is far from 
clear what the defendant's mental state must be. Section 76-2-202 
provides: 
Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense who directly 
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be 
criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
While on its face this section does not seem to require that the 
defendant have any intent to engage in the conduct in concert with 
others, as a matter of due process the State should not subject an 
individual to harsher punishment based on the random acts of 
others. Some element of intent, knowledge, or at least 
acquiescence in the aid of others must be required, although the 
statute fails to make this clear. 
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The statute likewise does not specify the nature of its 
true intent. The statute was enacted to combat the criminal street 
gang problem in Utah, yet fails to recognize, identify, or define 
the problem at all. Compare Cal. Penal Code §186.20 et seq. 
(outlining legislative goals (§186.21), defining "pattern of 
criminal gang activity" (§186.22 (e), and defining "criminal street 
gang" (§186.22 (f))) . California courts have relied on the 
specificity of the California statute in rejecting vagueness 
challenges. In re Alberto R. , 235 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 1 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 348 (1991); People v. Gamez, 235 Cal. App. 3d 957, 286 Cal. 
Rptr. 894 (1991). The language of the statute here is vague, and 
fails to convey the statute's true intent. 
B. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT CONTAINS NO 
GUIDELINES CONCERNING APPLICATION OF THE 
STATUTE. 
The Supreme Court has explained that the most critical 
aspect of the vagueness doctrine is the requirement that 
legislatures provide sufficient guidelines concerning the 
application of a penal statute: 
Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to 
citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized 
recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness 
doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other principal 
element of the doctrine -- the requirement that a 
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement." Smith [v. Goguen] , 415 U.S. [566,] 574, 94 
S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 [(1974)]. Where the 
legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a 
criminal statute may permit "a standardless sweep [that] 
allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their 
personal predilections." Id., at 575. 
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58 (footnote omitted). 
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The primary failing of the gang enhancement statute is 
its complete failure to set guidelines concerning its proper 
application. Section 76-3-203.1 impermissibly delegates basic 
policy matters to judges for resolution on an ad hoc basis, as 
reflected in the legislative history and the text of the statute. 
Judges are expected to use their discretion in 
determining whether Section 76-3-203.1 applies, as reflected in 
Rep. Rushton's statements in the legislative history: 
[T] he sentencing judge, rather than the jury, shall 
decide whether to impose the penalty. We are not going 
to make any effort to take the judicial discretion out of 
this penalty phase. It will give the judge the right, if 
he feels that an individual needs to be taken out of that 
situation for this enhanced period of time, the judge 
still has the discretion to either take him out for an 
enhanced period of time or . . . not. 
Legislative history at 3. In response to questions concerning the 
broad language of the statute, and whether persons who are not 
gangmembers could be convicted under the statute of "essentially 
gang activities", Rep. Rushton assured legislators that judges 
could be trusted to apply the statute in only the limited, gang-
related circumstances intended. Id. 
While the statute does in fact grant judges discretion to 
suspend application of the enhancement, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.1(6), it utterly fails to constrain or guide that discretion in 
any fashion. The legislature intended and expected that judges 
would refuse to apply the gang enhancement to defendants who were 
not actual gangmembers. Contrary to that intent, the enhancement 
has routinely been applied to individuals who are not gangmembers. 
Justice Howe has described the hazards of such a statute: 
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It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could 
set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, 
and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who 
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at 
large. This would, to some extent, substitute the 
judicial for the legislative department of the 
government. 
State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321, 1324 (Utah 1986) (Howe, J., 
concurring) (quoting U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221, 23 L.Ed. 563 
(1875)) . Section 76-3-203.1 casts a large net sweeps too broadly, 
without appropriate guidelines for the judges who are called upon 
to impose the enhancement. The gang enhancement statute should be 
declared void for vagueness. 
C. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT CHILLS THE EXERCISE 
OF SENSITIVE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS. 
The final consideration under Gravned is whether the 
challenged statute inhibits the exercise of basic first amendment 
freedoms. While criminal conduct in association with others is not 
protected by the First Amendment, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 
494, 516-17, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951), mere association 
with others is. NAACP. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 
460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1171, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488, 1498 (1958) ("It is 
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the 
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 
'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech."). 
As a result of the lack of guidelines constraining 
judicial discretion in application of the enhancement, individuals 
are left uncertain whether the enhancement might be applied to 
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them. Although the State is required to prove the mental state of 
the alleged aiders and abettors, to date this requirement has been 
sporadically applied at best. Against this backdrop, exercise of 
the right to association is being chilled. The statute causes 
citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than if 
the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked" and to 
avoid the association of other persons in order to avoid the 
uncertainty of the enforcement of the statute. The gang 
enhancement should be stricken as being unconstitutionally vague. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Labrum respectfully requests 
that the gang enhancement imposed against him be vacated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6 day of August, 1997. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
KRISTINE M. ROGERS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Court Order for Gang Enhancement, R. 83 9-42 
ThirH ln^i^i-si Histr: 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ERNEST W.JONES, 1736 — 
Deputy District Attorney j jji \T^ - % ? ? ^ J 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 I ^ j i t H ^ - l ^ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
TROY LABRUM, 
Defendant. Hon. Anne M. Stirba 
COURT ORDER FOR GANG 
ENHANCEMENT 
(76-3-203.1 UCA) 
CaseNo.921901791FS 
Based on a review of the trial transcript and the arguments of counsel the Court enters the 
following findings: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On September 20,1992 at 11:00 a.m., Kevin McCray overheard a conversation 
between David Mills and Troy Labrum in which they discussed wanting to shoot someone, (p. 
186) They also discussed borrowing Joe Kelly's car, a Mercury Topaz. Joshua Behunin was in 
the house, approximately 15-20 feet away, when this conversation took place about shooting 
someone. 
2. David Mills, Troy Labrum and Joshua Behunin left together in the Mercury 
Topaz, (p. 187) David Mills drove the car. Troy Labrum sat in the front passenger seat and 
Joshua Behunin sat in the back seat wearing a baseball cap. (p. 188-89) 
3. David Mills, Troy Labrum and Joshua Behumin pursued or followed the victims 
in a car for several blocks before shots were fired, (p. 69) 
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PROPOSED ORDER FOR GANG ENHANCEMENT 
Case No. 96 
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4. David Mills, Troy Labrum and Joshua Behunin "flashed gang signs" or signals at 
the victims during the pursuit, (p. 71) 
5. David Mills, Troy Labrum and Joshua Behunin were "staring" at the victims, (p. 
70) 
6. David Mills was identified as the driver of the car used in the drive-by shooting. 
(p. 76,113,144) 
7. Troy Labrum was identified as the person who fired five (5) shots at the victims, 
(p. 77,112) 
8. The next day, September 21,1992, Troy Labrum and Joshua Behunin showed 
Kevin McCray a newspaper article concerning a drive-by shooting on 2100 South and 700 East, 
(pg. 191) Troy Labrum bragged to Kevin McCray that "we did the shooting." (p. 191) 
9. Joshua Behunin burned the newspaper article about the shooting after the 
conversation was finished, (p. 191) 
10. Troy Labrum and David Mills were convicted of Attempted Homicide by a jury in 
Third District Court on February 16,1993. 
11. Joshua Behunin, a juvenile, was also arrested and charged in Juvenile Court with 
Attempted Homicide. Joshua Behunin was certified to stand trial as an adult. Joshua Behunin 
was bound over in a preliminary hearing to stand trial by Judge Dennis Fuchs on January 21, 
1993. Charges were dismissed without prejudice on April 20,1994 when the State was unable to 
locate the eye witnesses. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The gang enhancement statute pursuant to 76-3-203 is appropriate. The shooting 
of September 20, 1992 took place in concert with two or more persons. 
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2. Troy Labrum is sentenced to an additional six (6) years in prison under the gang 
enhancement statute. 
3. The gang enhancement statute pursuant to §76-3-203 is constitutional. 
DATED this P - B ^ a y of January, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
ANNE M. STIRBA, Judge * 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Proposed Order For Gang 
Enhancement was delivered to Kristine Rogers, Attorney for Defendant Troy Labrum, at 424 
East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the \4ri day of January, 1997. 
^Mh hh/Zh/A^ 
OEUVERED BY 
JA:j 2 t 1997 
P. ESPiNOZA 
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ADDENDUM B 
Gang Enhancement legislative history 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN SENATE BILL 52, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
76-3-203.1/ THE PENALTY ENHANCEMENT FOR OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THREE 
OR MORE PERSONS. 
Legislative History: 
Senate Bill 52, currently found in Utah Code Ann. section 
76-3-203*1/ and referred to in L* 1990/ ch. 207 section 1# was 
passed on February 21, 1990, approved on March 12, 1990/ and became 
effective on April 23/ 1990. 
The Office of Legislative Counsel to the Utah Legislature 
has no committee reports concerning this legislation. The only 
evidence of legislative intent to be found outside the statute 
itself is the taped and transcribed floor debates in the house and 
the senate. Tapes are available at the respective offices in the 
Utah State Capitol. 
House Floor debates on Senate Bill 52 
February 21f 1990 
Speaker of the House: 
Who's the sponsor of Senate Bill 52? Representative 
Rushton. 
Representative Rushton: 
Ah, this is kind of a surprise that it come up so fast this 
morning, ah, Senate Bill 52 is what's ended up after a lot 
of research this summer on the street gang problems, mostly 
in the Salt Lake County, some in Davis and Otah County. 
Ah, I'm sure most counties that have any town size at all 
will have ... be affected by the street gangs that are 
coming into Otah. There's several reasons why there's such 
a giant influx of criminal street gangs in atah. The main 
reason is the price differential of crack cocaine. Ah, in 
Los Angeles, crack cocaine is in a surplus or a buyer's 
market. It can be bought between three and four hundred 
dollars an ounce. That same crack cocaine will sell in 
Salt Lake for somewhere around twenty four hundred dollars 
an ounce in some rural cities in Otah we'll get as much as 
three hundred ...er three thousand dollars an ounce. This 
price differential has brought about a phenomenon with the 
Los Angeles street gangs that's called franchising. The 
reason it's called franchising, it isn't a whole lot 
different than McDonald's. They franchise out. We've 
always had local street gangs in Utah. They've been 
involved in petty crime, a social service nuisance, anyone 
who lives in this metropolitan area is familiar with them, 
the graffiti, ah, when I was a boy thirty five years ago, 
there were street gangs in Salt Lake City. Ah, but they 
they weren't the serious problem that they are becoming now! 
with the introduction of crack cocaine. Ah, police 
departments estimate that In the Salt Lake valley now there 
are six hundred plus members, identifiable members of these 
California style street gangs, of that six hundred, it is 
estimated that a hardened criminal core of the gangs, 
generally young adults — the gangs consist of youths all 
the way from nine, and I call them youths, nine to twenty 
five, thirty years old. The young adults that belong to 
this gang are, these gangs, it is estimated about three 
percent of this group are hardened criminals with 
associations with the street gangs in Los Angeles. When I 
became aware of the existence of Los Angeles type gangs in 
existence in my own neighborhood in Magna, and West Valley, 
I become quite alarmed. Itfs a scary thought when we know 
what happened to the Bronx in New York in the sixties 
because of street gangs. Three hundred and seventy 
something acres of the Bronx had to be literally given up 
from the law enforcement and levelled. One of the most 
vivid pictures of the street gang history in New York City, 
er, the Bronx in New York was three hundred and seventy 
acres of what was once communities, towns, neighborhoods, 
as they call them in New lork, and those buildings were 
bulldozed down, every last one of them, because of the 
situation that arose out of the Bronx street gangs in the 
fifties and sixties. Right now there are large areas of 
Los Angeles where law enforcement has given up. They have 
been bulldozed down. I don't think that situation will 
ever come to Salt Lake or to Ogden, Clearfield, where the 
street gangs are trenched right now, but elements of that 
environment have came to Salt Lake. Ah, Senator Fordham 
and myself become alarmed about this in about July of last 
year. We inquired of the Los Angeles County Attorney's 
Office on what was being done to prevent street gangs in 
there, they told us about a piece of legislation in 
California called "The Street Terrorism Prevention Act." 
We brought a copy of that act to Otah, we got a lot of 
literature about it, and we had a bill written up that 
patterned the Street Terrorism Act* But since that time, 
that act has run into constitutional problems in 
California, so we had representatives from SWAP, do a lot 
of research on it, and they came up, the Statewide 
Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, in conjunction with 
the Chief Police Association, came up with this bill, the 
group criminal activities penalty, which they feel 
confident avoids the constitutional problems of the 
California Street Terrorism Act and will be a useful tool. 
It doesnft have the political or the psychological effects 
that our original Street Terrorism bad, because we used the 
term gang, we used the term street terrorism in our bill, 
and they told us this was the reason why it would become 
constitutionally unsound. So, if Y°o "«<* the bill it will 
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not have the word "street gang" in it, in order to make it 
so we're not, the constitutional problem comes with 
labelling people by name. It is, looks benign, "Group 
Criminal Activities Penalty," but this is in fact what the 
Statewide of Prosecuting Attorneys have asked for and want 
for tools to be used against street gang prolification 
[sic] in the state of Utah. Ah, I can go through the act, 
ah, but the main parts of the act at first is it provides 
an enhanced penalty for group criminal activities, and that 
is supplied on line twenty four of first page, "if crimes 
are committed in concert of two or more persons" used in 
this second, the second page describes the enhanced 
penalties, ah, the idea behind the enhanced penalties in 
California and the idea here was to get that center core, 
that's the core group of hardened criminals that supplies 
the money, supplies the impetus for a true criminal street 
gang. We've got to differentiate that between a street 
gang and a criminal street gang - it's a different world 
altogether. Ah, it gets to the hardened core, and the 
social workers tell us that the only thing to do with them 
to allow social workers to work with the remainder of the 
young people at risk in these gangs is to get that hardened 
core off the streets. The enhanced penalty is designed for 
that purpose. Ah, so the second page deals with the 
enhanced penalties. The third page is a list of crimes 
that are effected by this bill and an important aspect of 
this bill that I hope will placate those that are worried 
about enhanced penalties, across this, I see John look at 
me right in the eyes. Because John and I have agreed on a 
lot of things and both of agree that enhanced penalties are 
something that has to be proven that there's a need for 
before you talk about it because a lot of enhanced 
penalties don't do anything more than create problems for 
the corrections. But this enhanced penalty, we have got to 
get that hard core of the street gang groups off of the 
streets, out of the street gangs. Ah, to soften the 
enhanced penalty, if you'll notice on the last page, page 
five of the bill, ah, the sentencing judge, rather than the 
jury, shall decide whether to impose the penalty. We are 
not going to make any effort to take the judicial 
discretion out of this penalty phase. It will give the 
judge the right, if he feels that that individual needs to 
be taken out of that situation for this enhanced period of 
time, the judge still has the discretion to either take him 
out for an enhanced period of time or - him, I shouldn't 
use him - take this person out for enhanced period of time 
or not. Ah, I think that the bill is self explanatory and 
thar it does have the support of the Statewide Police Chief 
Association and the Statewide Prosecuting Attorneys 
Ussociation, ah, the bill came from them as an answer to a 
problem that we brought to them. And I'd stand to ask, 
answer, any questions, ah, ... 
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Speaker of the House: 
Representatives to the bill, Representative Millner? 
Representative Millner: 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. First of all, I'd like to declare 
a conflict because I am a member of a street gang. I 
thought I'd get your attention with that. Om, I happen to 
have a group of young children in my neighborhood who are 
the siblings of members of street gangs. And, ah, in 
trying to perhaps dissuade them from criminal activities, 
we've formulated our own street gang, and of course our 
intents and purposes are perhaps to be, urn, good for the 
neighborhood, and urn, ah, we tried to take on little 
projects for that. But, I stand in support of this bill, 
but I do want to kind of state some concerns that I have, 
and that it that many times we have failed in our society 
to address in the concerns of our youth, which lead to 
juvenile street gangs, and I feel that many young people 
who come from broken homes and who don't have the 
environmental supports, or perhaps church support systems, 
kind of fall between the cracks. And so we have a 
responsibility, each one of us, if we see these young 
people, who get caught up in criminal activities, to try 
and become their friends and encourage them to get out of 
that kind of activity and lead them light, and so I stand 
in support of this bill, but I also want to send a 
message. And that message is that we need to provide 
opportunities for these young people, educational 
opportunities and employment for those who particularly get 
involved in juvenile crimes, and ah, so they don't get into 
drugs and other activities. And so I support the bill, 
thank you. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative Hales? 
Representative Hales: 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I would like to speak in support 
of this very important legislation. Z have a good citizen 
in my district who is in the business of coin operated game 
machines. Ah, he operates in several states, Utah is one 
of these, and he said in the past three or four months, 
these gang groups have cost him, as well as the stores, ah, 
Shopko, Smith's Pood King, as much as thirty thousand 
dollars in just a very short period of time. But he said 
in addition to the theft, and the property damage that has 
occurred, he has been really concerned about the 
aggressiveness of these groups. He said that very often 
these thefts occur during the time that the stores are 
open, sometimes at night when there's one night clerk on, 
they intimidate the night clerk. And as I became aware of 
this problem, and have visited with more people, I don't 
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think we're really talking about these neighborhood 
children that Representative Millner has talked about/ 
although it could be* Ah, they say that these groups are 
sophisticated enough that they know what the state laws 
are, and very often they will move around according to what 
the state law is that handles this kind of theft and this 
kind of aggression and property damage. So I urge your 
support of this legislation. I think it's really important 
and I have my hat off to those who've, a Senator Pordham 
and those who have brought this to our attention. Thank 
you. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative, ah, Tuttle? 
Representative Tuttle: 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I stand in support of this bill 
also. In the Magna times issue this summer, there was an 
article and pictures about the grafitti that was put in the 
buildings in Magna by different groups that are either 
copycatcing the groups in California or members, and I 
think it's well needed and I think we should support this. 
Thank you. 
Speaker of the Eouse: 
Representative Bush? 
Representative Bush: 
Oops. Thank you Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this • 
bill and I would ... Representative.. .sorry, Representative 
Rushton and Senator Pordham for looking into this. There's 
no sense waiting until our state becomes like some of these 
other areas of the country before we start doing something 
about it. I don't have any special horror stories to tell, 
but ah, this, I think this is one of the most important 
pieces of legislation we've had, and I commend thea for it 
and ask you to support it. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative Prante? 
Representative Prante: 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker, will the sponsor yield to a 
question? 
Representative Rushton: 
Yeah^ 
Speaker of the House: 
Sponsor yields, proceed. 
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Representative Prante: 
Hefs sitting right next to me, but I just want this 
clarified for myself. It's bard to ask him when he's on 
the microphone. Ah, the question I have is I'm ail for 
what the bill's doing, but the question I have and perhaps, 
ah, Representative Rushton can respond to it, is that when 
it refers to that a person commits a — two or more people 
committing a crime, and ah, such crimes as burglary and 
criminal trespass being those kind of crimes, I'm wondering 
if anytime two people, especially young people who haven't 
learned, maybe are yielding to impulse sometimes, and 
aren't members of actual gangs, how does it impact on them? 
Representative Rushton: 
The answer to these question probably would be better 
answered by a lawyer than by me, but I'm told that it is 
contained in the following paragraph when it talks about 
the concert action of two or more persons. Ah, it's also 
will fall, the problem that be talks about if if just two 
people commit burglary together does this constitute group 
criminal activities? Or three people it would have to be. 
You got the two people and the individual, the individual 
who does this in concern with two other people. Ah, I 
think that the best cover here is in the judicial 
discretion that's allowed in the last page. Ah, and the 
definition of concert action between these people - a legal 
definition. 
Representative Prante: 
Where's the definition? 
Representative Rushton: 
Ah, it's in section 76-2-202. Yeah, well, that's the 
judicial. 
Representative Prante: 
Maybe you could just read the section that's applicable to 
this, Representative, that shows the court's discretion? 
Representative Rushton: 
I don't have my book with me. 
Representative Prante: 
~ Oh. Okay-* Maybe ah, an attorney can comment on this. My 
conceth isn't with what it's doing, it's with, what if two 
people_steal apples off a tree? Or what if two people 
"Impossibly, impulsively take something from a home, are 
they suddenly convicted of essentially gang activities? ... 
Ah, I see there is the court discretion in it. Okay, thank 
you. 
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Representative Rushton: 
Yeah, that's what I was saying, that, thank you. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative Puller? 
Representative Fuller: 
Thank you, Mr* Speaker. Call for a previous question? 
Speaker of the House: 
Previous question has been called. All in favor of the 
previous question say "Aye"? Opposed "no9! Motion 
carries. Representative Rushton*) you may sum up. 
Representative Rushton: 
I could talk all night on gang problems in my neighborhood 
and all I have to say is when you see a young person with 
the blue skull cap of the California Crips 'gang in your 
neighborhood, if you're not scared, you don't understand 
what's going on. And ah, this law is directed at the core, 
it's not directed, as Joann has expressed, kids that are at 
risk, you see them wearing the gang signs, their ball cap 
turned around backwards on the West, or they sign each 
other with finger signs like this as they go by. Each gang 
has its own finger sign. Ah, these people that are at 
risk, and these are kids at risk. This bill is directed at 
that core criminal element, that three percent of those six 
hundred gang members that have been identified that provide 
the father figure in these gangs. And they provide also 
the connection the California gangs, the connection to the 
crack cocaine, the money that is fueling this explosion of 
gang activity in our cities and I'd like to ask you for 
your support for this bill and thank you for your time. 
Speaker of the House: 
Voting's open on Senate Bill 52. ... It appears to the 
chair that all present have voted. Voting is closed on 
Senate Bill 52. Senate Bill 52 has received SI affirmative 
and no negative votes passes this House. 
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Senate Floor debates on Senate Bill 52 
January 23 and 24, 1990 
January 23/ 1990 
Senator Fordham: 
Ah/ Mr. President and fellow Senators, this is an important 
bill. Ahf we've worked on this bill since the middle of 
the summer/ worked with the Attorney General's Office/ with 
prosecuting attorneys in this state, with other divisions 
of enforcement in this state. Originally, we bad a bill 
called the "Organization Gang Bill." In ah working with 
California, who this bill was patterned after, their billf 
and after they passed their law, we had an influx of gang 
members coming from California and infiltrating into Otab 
and establishing residence here and working as ah in their 
organization as members of, who had broken off from the 
California gangs. I think we need to send a message to 
these organized people that there isn't a place for them in 
Utah. Now we've had, in working with California, their 
problem was that it was so difficult to prove that a 
individual was a member of an organized gang. We changed 
our bill to read "Group Criminal Activity" and it involves 
when two or more commit a crime/ then they're subject to 
the penalties that are made in this law. And ah let me 
just read what/ quickly if I can, a class B misdemeanor/ 
the individual shall serve a minimum of ninety consecutive 
days in the jail. If the offense is a class A misdemeanor/ 
the convicted person shall serve a minimum term of a 
hundred and eighty consecutive days. If the offense is a 
third degree felony the convicted person shall be sentenced 
to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison. If 
the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person 
shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years 
in prison. And if the. offense is a first degree felony, 
the person shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term 
of nine years in prison. We felt that we need to make very 
'restrictive [sic], and these, ah these charges would be 
administered and sentenced by the judge without always 
going to a jury hearing. It would depend on the ah crime 
that was committed if they had a jury hearing. I have many 
clippings/ too many to go over/ let me just read you the 
heads of some of these that happens in our state. "Warning 
signs blew up at side of girl's bed," and this is in 
school, ah Kearns. Here's, "Suspect arrested in shooting 
at a market." This is in December 28 of last year. 
"Police believe two arrested teens belong to dangerous new 
cangr" "Gang fight leaves three stabbed." "Street gang 
fires on a family/ two die." "Spray painted grafitti/" and 
this bill covers those actsf that if it's this kind of 
destruction of property is committed by two or more people, 
there's a penalty for them and they're, it's just something 
that we need to adopt to control this. Now in working with 
the prosecutors/ they felt that it was very difficult under 
the gang bill to identify these people with the gangs. 
8 
California, in working with them and talking with them, ah, 
wishes that they had developed their law the way we're 
developing this one in Otah. It would be much more 
enforceable by them. How I might just show you the volume 
here is the California gang law that they have. So if 
there are any questions that I could respond to, Ifd be 
glad to, Mr. President. 
President of the Senate: 
Senator Chuck Peterson? 
Senator Chuck Peterson: 
Mr. Fordham, ah, Senator Fordham, is this differentiate, is 
it the location code a differentiation between juvenile and 
other people, I mean, ah, would your bill apply to 
juveniles under eighteen? 
Senator Fordham: 
It would apply to any crime that was committed by two or 
more persons. 
Senator Chuck Peterson: 
That's what I'm wondering about. I'll have to ask the 
legal people on the Senate, the lawyers, whether or not 
this is possible for us to pass legislation that would 
apply to, that would provide these penalties for a 
juvenile. I just don't know whether or not we can do 
that. Senator Hillyard? 
Senator Hillyard: 
My problem when I read that Senator Peterson is the fact 
that there's three of us here together and that may 
constitute a criminal gang. 
Senator Chuck Peterson: 
That's for sure. I think it does. Yeah, I, there's no 
question about that. 
Senator Hillyard: 
I would say this. The general law defining juveniles in 
that section would override this unless there is a specific 
mention of that and I'd have to look at the law. I was not 
on the committee when this bill was debated, ah, I had 
another conflict that took me out of these bills9 I have 
not had a chance to see that but I think that's a 
legitimate question that staff who drafted the bill could 
answer. 
President of the-Senate: 
Senator Steel? 
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Senator Steele: 
Thank you, Kr. President, I have a question as it relate to 
ah, relates to a potential in our state of moving towards 
what's termed in many states, "shock incarceration". In 
quick summary, as a listing, first time felons, for 
example, ages eighteen through twenty six are placed in 
some states in a ninety day incarceration boot camp 
environment. The recidivism, the impact on those 
particular individuals in the cites that I noted, I've had 
discussion with, seems to be very effective and very 
appealing and our state is looking as possible alternatives 
to what we're currently doing. Would these minimum, my 
question, these minimum requirements, ah circumvent that 
process? 
Senator Pordham: 
I don't think that it would circumvent it, I think they 
would be part of. The judge has the authority to say where 
these individuals would be incarcerated or be subjected to 
review or whatever, as I understand it, the judge would be 
able to put these people where they, where he felt that it 
would be the most good for them. 
President of the Senate: 
Further questions of Senator Pordham? Senator Cornaby, are 
you voting on that one... I don't see any further questions 
then. 
Unidentified speaker: 
I move for' the adoption of the bill. 
President of the Senate: 
Question has been called, for the question shall Senate 
Bill 52 be read for the third time? 
[Senators vote orally] 
Senate Bill 52 shows twenty five ayes, no nays, four being absent, 
the bill passes, to be placed on the third reading calendar. 
January 24, 1990 
President of the Senate: 
Senator McCallister? 
Senator Pordham 
Personal prTvilege Mr. 
ADDENDUM C 
California "Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention 
Act," Cal. Penal Code § 186.20 et seq. (Supp. 1996) 
Chapter 11 
STREET TERRORISM ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION ACT 
Section 
186.20. 
186.21. 
186.22. 
186.22a. 
Citation. 
Legislative findings and declaration. 
Participation in criminal street gang; 
punishment; felony conviction; sen-
tence enhancement; commission on or 
near school grounds; pattern of crimi-
nal gang activity. 
Buildings or places used by criminal 
street gangs; nuisance; additional 
remedies; confiscation of firearms or 
Section 
186.23. 
186.24. 
186.25. 
18626. 
18627. 
186.28. 
deadly or dangerous weapons owned 
or possessed by gang members. 
Mutual aid activities; labor organiza-
tions. 
Severability. 
Local laws; preemption. 
Criminal street gang; violent coercion to 
participate; offense. 
Duration of chapter. 
Firearms; supply, sell or give posses-
sion; participation in criminal street 
gangs. 
Chapter 11 was added by Stats.1988, & 12*2, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c 1256, § 1, 
eff Sept 26, 1988. 
Repeal 
Chapter 11 is repealed Jan. 1, 1997, by the provisions of § 186.27. 
Law Review Commentaries 
Gang evidence: Issues for criminal defense. Susan L. 
Burrell, 30 Santa Clara L.Rev. 739 (1990). 
§ 18620. Citation 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "California Street Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention Act." 
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988.) 
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Historical and Statutory Notes 
1988 Legislation 
Section 5 of Stats.1988, c 1256, provides: 
"On or before January 1, 1991, the District Attorney of 
Los Angeles County and the City Attorney of the City of 
Los Angeles shall submit a report to the Legislature on 
the effect of this act on the control of criminal street gang 
activity in the County of Los Angeles, The report shall 
include, but need not be limited to, aD of the following: 
"(a) The number of arrests under this act 
"(b) The number of prosecutions under this act 
} 186.21. Legislative findings and declaration 
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that it is the right of every person, regardless of race, color, 
creed, religion, national origin, sex, age, sexual orientation, or handicap, to be secure and protected from 
fear, intimidation, and physical harm caused by the activities of violent groups and individuals. It is not 
the intent of this chapter to interfere with the exercise of the constitutionally protected rights of freedom 
of expression and association. The Legislature hereby recognizes the constitutional right of every citizen 
to harbor and express beliefs on any lawful subject whatsoever, to lawfully associate with others who 
share similar beliefs, to petition lawfully constituted authority for a redress of perceived grievances, and 
to participate in the electoral process. 
The Legislature, however, further finds that the State of California is in a state of crisis which has been 
caused by violent street gangs whose members threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes 
against the peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods. These activities, both individually and collectively, 
present a clear and present danger to public order and safety and are not constitutionally protected. The 
Legislature finds that there are nearly 600 criminal street gangs operating in California, and that the 
number of gang-related murders is increasing. The Legislature also finds that in Los Angeles County 
alone there were 328 gang-related murders in 1986, and that gang homicides in 1987 have increased 80 
percent over 1986. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to seek the eradication of 
criminal activity by street gangs by focusing upon patterns of criminal gang activity and upon the 
organized nature of street gangs, which together, are the chief source of terror created by street gangs. 
The Legislature further finds that an effective means of punishing and deterring the criminal activities of 
street gangs is through forfeiture of the profits, proceeds, and instrumentalities acquired, accumulated, or 
used by street gangs. 
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eft Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1, eft Sept 26, 1988.) 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
1988 Legislation 
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the 
same 3ession of the legislature, see Government Code 
§ 9605. 
§ 1F6.22. Participation in criminal street gang; punishment; felony conviction; sentence en-
hancement; commission on or near school grounds; pattern of criminal gang activity 
(a) Any person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members 
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or 
assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment in 
a county jail for a period not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or 
2 or 3 years. 
(by I) Except as provided in paragraph (4), any person who is convicted of a felony committed for the 
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to 
promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members, shall, upon conviction of that felony, 
in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony or attempted felony of which he 
or she has been convicted, be punished by an additional term of one, two, or three years at the court's 
discretion * * *. 
(2) If the underlying felony described in paragraph (1) is committed on the grounds of, or within 1,000 
feet of, a public or private elementary, vocational, junior high, or high school, during hours in which the 
facility is open for classes or school related programs or when minors are using the facility, the additional 
term shall be two, three, or four years, at the court's discretion. * * * 
Additions or changes Indicated by underline; deletions by asterisks * * * 
"(c) The number of trials which have resulted from 
prosecutions under this act, and the number of pleas 
which resulted. 
"(d) The number of convictions under this act 
"(e) The number and type of sentence enhancements 
which have been sought under this act, and the number 
and kind which have been ordered by the courts. 
"(f) 'Hie number of nuisance abatement actions under 
this act* 
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the 
same session of the legislature, see Government Code 
$ 9606. 
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(3) The court shall order the imposition of the middle term of the sentence enhancement, unless there 
are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation. The court shall state the reasons for its choice of 
sentence enhancements on the record at the time of the sentencing. 
(4) Any person who violates this subdivision in the commission of a felony punishable by imprisonment 
in the state prison for life, shall not be paroled until a minimum of 15 calendar years have been served. 
(c) If the court grants probation or suspends the execution of sentence imposed upon the defendant for 
a violation of subdivision (a), or in cases involving a true finding of the enhancement enumerated in 
subdivision (b), the court shall require that the defendant serve a minimum of 180 days in a county jail as 
a condition thereof. 
(d) Notwithstanding any other law, the court may strike the additional punishment for the enhance-
ments provided in this section or refuse to impose the minimum jail sentence for misdemeanors in an 
unusual case where the interests of justice would best be served, if the court specifies on the record and 
enters into the minutes the circumstances indicating that the interests of justice would best be served by 
that disposition. 
(e) As used in this chapter, "pattern of criminal gang activity" means the commission, attempted 
commission, or solicitation of two or more of the following offenses, provided at least one of those offenses 
occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of those offenses occurred within three years 
after a prior offense, and the offenses are committed on separate occasions, or by two or more persons: 
(1) Assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, as defined 
in Section 245. 
(2) Robbery, as defined in Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 211) of Title 8 of Part 1. 
(3) Unlawful homicide or manslaughter, as defined in Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 187) of Title 
8 of Part 1. 
(4) The sale, possession for sale, transportation, manufacture, offer for sale, or offer to manufacture 
controlled substances as defined in Sections 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, and 11058 of the Health and 
Safety Code. 
(5) Shooting at an inhabited dwelling or occupied motor vehicle, as defined in Section 246. 
(6) Discharging or permitting the discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle, as defined in 
subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 12034. 
(7) Arson, as defined in Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 450) of Title 13. 
(8) The intimidation of witnesses and victims, as defined in Section 136.1. 
(9) Grand theft, as defined in Section 487, when the value of the money, labor, or real or personal 
property taken exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000). 
(10) Grand theft of any vehicle, trailer, or vessel, as described in Section 487h. 
(11) Burglary, as defined in Section 459. 
(12) Rape, as defined in Section 261. 
(13) Looting, as defined in Section 463. 
(14) Moneylaundering, as defined in Section 186.10. 
(15) Kidnapping, as defined in Section 207. 
(16) Mayhem, as defined in Section 203. 
(17) Aggravated mayhem, as defined in Section 205. 
(18) Torture, as defined in Section 206. 
(19) Felony extortion, as defined in Sections 518 and 520. 
(20) Felony vandalism, as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 594. 
(21) Carjacking, as defined in Section 215. 
(22) The sale, delivery, or transfer of a firearm as described in Section 12072. 
(23) Possession of a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person in 
violation of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 12101. 
(f) As used in this chapter, "criminal street gang" means any ongoing organization, association, or 
group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the 
commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (23), inclusive, of 
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subdivision (e), having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members 
individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity. 
(g) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 1997, and on that date is repealed. 
(Added by Stats.1989, c 930, $ 5.1, operative Jan. 1, 1993. Amended by Stats.1991, c. 201 (A.B.I135), 
§ 1, operative Jan. 1, 1993; Stats.1991, c. 661 (A.B.1866), § 2, operative Jan. 1, 1993; Stats.1993, c. 601 
(S.B.724), § 1; Stats.1993, c. 610 (A.B.6), § 3, eff. Oct 1,1993; Stats.1993, c. 611 (S.B.60), § 3, e£f. Oct 1, 
1993; Statl993, c. 1125 (AB.1630), § 3; Stats.1994, c. 47 (S.B.480), § 1, eff. April 19,1994; Stats.1994, c, 
451 (A.B.2470), § 1; Stata.1995, c. 377 (S.B.1095), § 2.) 
Repeal 
Section 186,22 is repealed by its ovm terms on Jan. 2, 1997. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
1989 Legislation 
Section 12.5 of Stats.1989, c 930 provides: 
"Sections 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 8.1, 9.1, and 11.1 of this act shall 
become operative on January 1, 1993, unless a later 
enacted statute, which is enacted before January 1, 1993, 
changes that date." 
1991 Legislation 
The 1991 amendment inserted the provision relating to 
the additional term imposed when the underlying felony is 
committed on the grounds of or within 1,000 feet of 
certain schools; and added provisions relating to the 
operative date and the repeal of the section. 
Effect of amendment of section by two or more acts at 
the same session of the legislature, see Government Code 
§ 9605. 
1992 Legislation 
Former § 186.22, added by Stats.1988, c 1242, 5 1; 
Stats.1988, c 1256, § 1, amended by Stats.1989, c 144, 
§ 1; Stats.1989, c 930, § 5; Stats.1991, c 661 (AB.1866), 
§ 1, rel&ting to similar subject matter, was repealed by its 
own terms effective Jan. 1, 1998. 
1993 Legislation 
The 1993 amendment by c 611 inserted subd (eX8) 
relating to carjacking. 
Section affected by two or more acts at the same 
session of the legislature, see Government Code § 9605. 
Amendments of this section by §§ 3.02, 3.06, 3.08, 3.09, 
3.1, 3 4 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 of State. 
1993, c. 611, failed to become operative under the provi-
sions of § 41 of that Act 
Amendments of this section by §§ 3.02, 3.06, 3.08, 3.09, 
3.1, 3 4 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 of Stats. 
1993 c. 610, failed to become operative under the provi-
sions of § 36 of that Act. 
The 1993 amendment by c 1125 added subd, (eX8) 
relating to grand theft of a vehicle; deleted former subd. 
(e)(8), which read "Carjacking, as defined in Section 215"; 
deleted subd (g) which provided an operative date of Jan. 
1, 1993; redesignated as 3ubd. (g) former subd. (h); in 
subd. (g), deleted "unless a later enacted statute which is 
enacted before January 1, 1997, deletes or extends that 
date"; and made other nonsubstantive changes. 
1994 Legislation 
The 1994 amendment, by c. 47, in subd (a), substituted 
"16 months, or 2 or 3 years" for "one, two, or three 
}earsn; in subd. (b)(1), deleted "which is" following "who 
is convicted of a felon/*; rewrote subd, (c); in subd (d), 
deleted "provision of" foDowing "Notwithstanding any oth-
er"; in subd (e), redesignated as pars. (7) and (8) former 
pars. (6) and (7), inserted par. (6) relating to discharge of 
a firearm from a motor vehicle, redesignated as par. (10) 
former par. (8), and inserted pars, (9) and (11) to (21) 
relating, respectively, to grand theft exceeding $10,000, 
burglary, rape, looting, money laundering, kidnapping, 
mayhem, aggravated mayhem, torture, felony extortion, 
felony vandalism and carjacking; and in subd (f), substi-
tuted "(21)" for "(8)", substituted "having" for "which has" 
following "subdivision (eT and inserted "and" following 
"symbol,". Prior to amendment, subd (c) read: 
"(c) Any person who is convicted of a public offense 
punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor, which is com-
mitted for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in associa-
tion with, any criminal street gang, with the specific intent 
to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by 
gang members, shaD be punished by imprisonment in a 
county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in 
the state prison for one, two, or three years, provided that 
any person sentenced to imprisonment in a county jafl 
shall be imprisoned for a period not to exceed one year, 
but not less than 180 days, and shaD not be eligible for 
release upon completion of sentence, parole, or any other 
basis, until he or she has served 180 days. If the court 
grants probation or suspends the execution of sentence 
imposed upon the defendant, it shall require as a condition 
thereof that the defenaant serve 180 days in a county 
jafl." 
The 1994 amendment by c. 451 added subd. (e)(22) 
relating to 3ale, delivery, or transfer of a firearm; and 
added subd (eX23) relating to possession. 
The 1994 amendment of this section by c. 451 (A.B.2470) 
explicitly amended the 1994 amendment of this section by 
c 47 (S.B.480). 
Section 17 of Stats.1994, c 451 (A.B.2470), provides: 
"This bill shaD become operative only if Assembly Bill 
2428 of the 199&-94 Regular Session of the Legislature 
[Stats.1994, c 454] is chaptered and becomes effective on 
or before January 1, 1995." 
1995 Legislation 
The 1995 amendment, in subd (b)(1), substituted "para-
graph (4)" for "paragraph (2)"; in subd. (b), inserted 
paragraph designations (2) and (3); in subd. (b)(2), insert-
ed "described in paragraph (1)" following "felony"; redes-
ignated as subd. (bX4) former subd. (bX2); and made 
nonsubstantive changes throughout 
Cross References 
Firearm possession during street gang crimes, sentence 
enhancement, see Penal Code § 12021.5. 
Juvenile court rules related to this section, see Califor-
nia Rules of Court, rule 1404. 
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Code of Regulations References 
Gang, definition, see 15 CaL Code of Regs. § 3000. 
Law Review Commentaries 
Review of selected 1989 California legislation. 21 Pac. 
LJ. 425 (1990). 
Review of selected 1993 California legislation. 25 Pac 
LJ. 513 (1994). 
Review of selected 1994 California legislation. 26 Pac. 
LJ. 202 (1995). 
Library References 
California Jury Instructions—Criminal [CALJIC]. 
United States Supreme Court 
Death penalty, admissibility of evidence, gang member-
ship, freedom of association, see Dawson v. Delaware, 
1992,112 S.Ct 1093,117 L.Ed^d 309, on remand 608 KM 
1201, appeal after remand 637 A^d 57. 
Notes of Decisions 
In general L8 
Active participation 5 
Admissibility of evidence 7.5 
Bifurcation 10 
Common name or identifying symbol 
Due process L5 
Expert testimony 7.6 
Gang purposes or benefit 9 
Injunction 12 
Instructions 11 
Ongoing organization 3 
Pattern of activity 3J> 
Predicate offense 7 
Presumptions and burden of proof 2 
Primary activity 4 
Sufficiency of evidence 8 
Validity 1 
L Validity 
"Benefit" as used in statute providing for sentence 
enhancement for defendant convicted of felony as criminal 
street gang member where felony is for benefit of street 
gang was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad when 
term was read in conjunction with statute's qualifying 
language so as to limit scope to only those acts committed 
with specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any 
criminal conduct by gang members. In re Alberto R. 
(App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235 CaLApp.3d 
1309. 
Phrase "and the last of those offenses occurred within 
three years after a prior offense," which was part of 
definition of "pattern of criminal gang activity" contained 
in Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, was 
not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, despite defen-
dant's anticipated scenarios in which gang members could 
be charged for crimes in future of which they had no 
knowledge and in which they did not participate. In re 
Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235 
CaLApp.3d 1309. 
"Primary activities" as used in statutory definition of 
"criminal street gang" whose members could receive sen-
tence enhancement if convicted of felony as member was 
not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad despite conten-
tion that enforcement would be arbitrary based on who 
made decision of what gang's primary activities were; 
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention .Art, of 
which phrase was part, specifically listed felonious conduct 
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required to invoke its provisions. In re Alberto R. (App. 
4 Dist 1991) 1 CaiRptr^d 348, 235 CaLApp.3d 1309. 
"Promote, further, or assist" as used in statute provid-
ing for sentence enhancement for defendant convicted of 
felony as criminal street gang member was not unconsti-
tutionally vague or overbroad inasmuch as phrase had 
been consistently used by courts to describe aiding and 
abetting. In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 CaL 
Rptr.2d 348, 235 CaLApp.3d 1309. 
Statute making it offense to actively participate in 
criminal street gang activity and providing for sentence 
enhancement based on that activity is not unconstitution-
ally overbroad. In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 
CaLRptr^d 348, 235 CaLApp.3d 1309. 
Statute providing for sentence enhancement for defen-
dant convicted of felony as criminal street gang member 
did not violate equal protection despite defendant's char-
acterization of enhancement as being similar to crime of 
conspiracy, which included procedural safeguards that 
enhancement did not; conspiracy required agreement 
with others to commit offense, while enhancement statute 
required active participation in felonious criminal gang 
activity, and defendant subject to enhancement was not 
similarly situated to defendant charged with conspiracy. 
In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235 
CaLApp.3d 1309. 
Statutory provision pursuant to which defendant con-
victed of felony as criminal street gang member was 
subject to sentence enhancement if felony was convicted 
with "specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any 
criminal conduct by gang members" provided adequate 
notice of what conduct was proscribed and was not uncon-
stitutionally vague. In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 1 
Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235 Cal.App.3d 1309. 
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act and 
its provision for sentence enhancement for defendant con-
victed of felony as criminal street gang member did not 
vest unfettered discretion; Act specifically designated 
crimes in which gang had to be involved. In re Alberto R. 
(App. 4 Dist. 1991) 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 235 CalApp.3d 
1309. 
When narro-;y construed to pertain only to conduct 
that was purely felonious. i.e., punishable in state prison, 
phrase felonious criminal conduct" as used in statute 
making it offense to promote, further, or assist such 
conduct by gang members was not unconstitutionally 
PENAL CODE 
vague or overbroad. In re Alberto R. (App. 4 Dist 1991) 
1 CaLRptrJW 348, 235 CaLAppJJd 1309. 
Sentence enhancement for "membership* in criminal 
street gang was not unconstitutionally vague. People v. 
Gamez (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286 CaLRptr. 894, 235 Cal. 
App.3d 967. 
Sentence enhancement provision for crimes committed 
in association with criminal street gang, with specific 
intent to promote, further or assist in criminal conduct of 
members of gang, did not violate due process, even though 
it did not require proof that defendant was aware of 
predicate offenses committed by other gang members. 
People v. Gamez (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286 CaLRptr. 894, 235 
Cal.App.3d 957. 
Sentence enhancement provision for participation in 
"criminal street gang" was not unconstitutionally over-
broad; statute regulated criminal conduct, not speech or 
association, and there was no right of association to 
engage in mminal conduct People v. Gamez (App. 4 
Dist 1991) 286 CaLRptr. 894, 235 CalApp.3d 957. 
Sentence enhancement provision for participation in 
"mminal street gang" was not unconstitutionally vague; 
statutory definition clarified that it was not mere associa-
tion with others, but rather association with others for 
purpose of committing crime, where association's very 
existence was founded upon commission of crime, that was 
prohibited. People v. Gamez (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286 
CaLRptr. 894, 235 CaLApp.3d 967. 
Fact that terms of this section were not perfectly 
defined or may not have been defined precisely did not 
invalidate section under due process clause. People v. 
Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaL 
App.3d 692. 
The term "criminal street gang," as used in this section 
was sufficiently defined and did not render section uncon-
stitutionally vague under due process clause; section did 
not make it criminal to be member ot undefined "gang" 
but prohibited membership in criminal street gang which 
was de&ned as any ongoing organization, association, or 
group of three or more persons, whether formal or infor-
mal, having as one of its primary activities the commission 
of one or more enumerated criminal acts. People v. 
Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaL 
App.3d 692. 
The phrase **knowledge of pattern of criminal gang 
activity" was not unconstitutionally vague under due pro-
cess clause; term "knowledge" was often used in criminal 
law meaning awareness of particular facts proscribed in 
criminal statutes and "pattern of criminal gang activity" 
was defined in this section. People v. Green (App. 1 Dist 
199H 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaLApp.3d 692. 
The phrase i4willfoJly promotes, furthers, or assists in 
any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang" 
was not unconstitutionally vague under due process 
clause; similarity of phrase with that employed in deter-
mining if person is aider and abettor indicated that phras-
es should be viewed as anonymous. People v. Green 
(App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaLApp.3d 692. 
Although phrase "felonious criminal conduct" had some 
uncertainty, it could be construed to cover only conduct 
which was clearly felonious, i.e., which amounted to com-
mission of offense punishable by imprisonment in state 
prison and, as so construed, this section was not unconsti-
tutionally vague under due process clause. People v. 
Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaL 
App.3d 692. 
1.5. Due process 
Due process requires pleading enhancement under this 
chapter and requires proof of each fact required. In re 
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Note 3,5 
Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 
CaLApp.3d 990. 
1.8. In general 
Mere membership in street gang is not a crime. People 
ex reL Gailo v. Acuna (App. 6 Dist 1996) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 
589, 34 CaLApp.4th 136, review granted and opinion su-
perseded 43 CaLRptr^d 680, 899 P.2d 66. 
2. Presumptions and burden of proof 
In prosecution for OTninal street gang offense or when 
state is seeking criminal street gang sentence enhance-
ment it is incumbent upon prosecution to prove through 
competent evidence the elements of a criminal street gang 
as set out in the statute, including the offenses necessary 
to satisfy the pattern requirement People v. GardeJey 
(App. 6 Dist 1994) 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 136, 30 CaLApp.4th 402, 
34 Cal.App.4th 1614, review granted and opinion super-
seded 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 406, 890 P.2d 1115. 
In prosecution for criminal street gang offense or when 
state is seeking CTiminal street gang sentence enhance-
ment, while a gang expert can give opinion as to whether 
predicate crime was act in furtherance of gang activities if 
such testimony on ultimate issue would assist trier of fact, 
if, as a basis for that opinion, expert is not relying on facts 
he had observed, or of which he had personal knowledge, 
or that were given to him as an assumption from evidence 
introduced in the case, his testimony can only be elicited 
in the form of hypothetical question, and that opinion, in 
turn, stands or falls depending, initially, upon whether 
trier of fact finds assumed facts to be true or false from 
evidence introduced to establish existence of such facta. 
People v. Gardeley (App. 6 Dist 1994) 36 CaLRptr^d 136, 
30 CaLApp.4th 402, 34 CaLApp.4th 1614, review granted 
and opinion superseded 39 CaLKptr^d 406, 890 ?2d 1116. 
For mminal street gang sentence enhancement to be 
found true, there must be substantial evidence to support 
finding of existence of "criminal street gang" members 
engaged in "pattern of criminal gang activity." Matter of 
Jose T. (App. 2 Dist 1991) 282 CaLRptr. 76, 230 CaL 
App.3d 1455, review denied 
Pattern of criminal gang activity used to support sen-
tence enhancement pursuant to this chapter does not 
require that the pattern of criminal street gang activity be 
shown by instances of purposeful gang activity. In re 
Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 
Cal.App.3d 990. 
Enhancement pursuant to this chapter does not require 
proof of two different offenses rather than two instances 
of the same offense. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 
1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 990. 
3. Ongoing organization 
Element of "criminal 3treet gang" for sentence en-
hancement pursuant to California Street Terrorism En-
forcement and Prevention Act that there be an ongoing 
organization of three or more persons was met by testimo-
ny of juvenile witnesses identifying at least three partici-
pants in particular incident as members of a street gang, 
testimony that there was a membership roD written on a 
wall, and that members, friends, and supporters of the 
group were capable of concerted action. In re Nathaniel 
C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLAppAi 
990. 
3.5. Pattern of activity 
Pattern of criminal gang activity element of offense of 
participating in criminal street gang does not require 
proof of prior enumerated offense, but rather may be 
based on incident for which defendant is on triaL People 
v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist. 1995) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 33 
Cal.App.4th 1509, 38 CaLApp.4th 1125, as modified, review 
§ 186.22 
Note 3.5 
granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr.2d 678, 899 
P.2d64. 
Single incident, even incident on which current prosecu-
tion is based, can provide factual basis to find pattern of 
criminal gang activity required to support conviction for 
participating in criminal street gang. People v. Loeun 
(App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 Cai.Rptr.2d 160, 33 CaLApp.4th 
1609, 38 CaLApp.4th 1125, as modified, review granted 
and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr^d 678, 899 P2d 64. 
Evidence supported finding of pattern of criminal gang 
activity required to support defendant's conviction for 
participating in criminal street gang, based on predicate 
offenses of two separate assaults with deadly weapons by 
gang members; defendant hit victim with bat and another 
member of same gang hit victim numerous times with 
long, thin object People v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 
CaLRptr^d 160, 33 CaLApp.4th 1509, 38 CaLApp.4th 1125, 
as modified, review granted and opinion superseded 43 
Cal.Rptr. 2d 678, 899 P.2d 64. 
Under "continuous course of conduct" exception to una-
nimity requirement, jurors did not have to unanimously 
agree on which two of several possible predicate offenses 
established that gang had engaged in pattern of criminal 
activity, and thus was "criminal street gang," in order to 
find defendant guilty of knowingly participating in crimi-
nal street gang and to impose enhanced punishment based 
on finding that murder was committed in association with 
such gang; pertinent element of definition of criminal 
street gang, Le., organization whose members engage in 
"pattern of criminal gang activity" contemplated continu-
ous course of conduct People v. Funes (App. 1 Dist 
1994) 28 CaLRptr^d 758, 23 CaLApp.4th 1506, modi^ed on 
denial of rehearing, review denied. 
4. Primary activity 
Requirement for enhancement of sentence pursuant to 
this chapter that the primary activity of the street gang at 
issue be crirninal activity is a proper subject of expert 
opinion. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 
CaLRptr. 236, 228 Cal.App.3d 990. 
Testimony by police officer, qualified as an expert, that 
primary activity of all the gangs in his area was criminal 
and that one of the crimes they committed was assault 
with a deadly weapon was insufficient to show that partic-
ular gang whose conduct was at issue with respect to 
enhancement pursuant to this chapter had criminal activi-
ty as a primary activity; expert did not identify the gang 
as one of the gangs in his area and the list of crimes which 
he said gangs commit included only one of the eight 
offenses specified in the statute. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 
1 Dist 1991) 279 Cal.Rptr. 236, 228 Cal.App.3d 990. 
FCJTUS of this chapter is narrower than general criminal 
conduct; evidence supporting enhancement pursuant to 
the Act must establish that a primary activity of the gang 
is one or more of listed offenses. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 
1 Dist. 1991) 279 Cal.Rptr. 236, 228 Cal.App.3d 990. 
5, Active participation 
Sentence enhancement provision for "active partic-
ipation " in criminal street gang was not unconstitutionally 
vague; to be convicted, defendant must have more than 
nominal, passive, inactive or purely technical relationship 
with gang, and person must devote all, or substantia] part 
of his time and efforts to criminal street gang. People v. 
Gamez (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286 CaLRptr. 894, 235 Cal. 
App.3d 957. 
To be convicted of being active participant in street 
gang, defendant must have relationship with criminal 
street gang which is more than nominal, passive, inactive 
or purely technical, and defendant must devote all, or 
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gang. People v. Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr. 
140, 227 CaLApp.3d 692. 
The terms "actively participate'* and "membership" 
gang were not unconstitutionally vague under due process 
clause; term "member'* had ordinary meaning and had 
also been judicially de&ned to mean a person who bears 
relationship to organization that is not accidental, artificial 
or unconsciously in appearance only and the phrase "ac-
tively participate,n in context, had same meaning as "ac-
tive membership" as defined by case law. People v. 
Green (App. 1 Dist 1991) 278 CaLRptr. 140, 227 CaL 
App.3d 692. 
6. Common name or identifying symbol 
Association of multiple names with a gang satisfies 
requirement of this chapter that the gang have a common 
name or common identifying sign or symbol, as long as at 
least one name is common to the gang's members. In re 
Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 Cal.Rptr. 236, 228 
Cal.App.3d 990. 
Element of criminal street gang for sentence enhance-
ment purposes pursuant to California Street Terrorism 
Enforcement and Prevention Act that the organization 
have a common name or common identifying sign or 
symbol was met by evidence that its members were 
known by two names and that there was graffiti which 
signified the gang, although no particular ct: lor or clothing 
was associated with gang membership. In re Nathaniel 
C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 Cal.Rptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 
990. 
7. Predicate offense 
"Pattern of criminal gang activity" cannot be estab-
lished for sentence enhancement purposes by use of predi-
cate crimes that occur after the crime for which the 
defendant is being tried. People v. Godinez (App. 2 Dist 
1993) 22 CaLRptr^d 164, 17 CaLApp.4th 1363, review 
denied. 
For purposes of juvenile proceeding, robbery, murder, 
and attempted murder of rival gang member were crimes 
committed on "separate occasions" within meaning of 
criminal street gang sentence enhancement statute, since 
juvenile had reasonable opportunity to reflect on actions 
in eight hours between robbery and attempted murder. 
Matter of Jose T. (App. * Dist 1991) 282 Cal.Rptr. 75, 230 
CaLApp.3d 1465, review denied. 
For purpose of juvenile proceeding, robbery, murder 
and attempted murder which were committed by two or 
more persons constituted qualifying predicate offenses for 
imposition of street gang sentencing enhancement, pursu-
ant to requirement that predicate offenses must have been 
committed on separate occasions or by two or more 
persons. Matter of Jose T. (App. 2 Dist 1991) 282 
Cal.Rptr. 75, 230 CaL\pp.3d 1455, review denied 
If there had been competent proof that one member of 
gang had shot another, that would have sufficed to show a 
predicate offense for a pattern of criminal gang activity 
under the enhancement provisions of this chapter; this 
section does not exempt from its scope those predicate 
offenses committed by gang members as part of internal 
gang disputes or power struggles. In re Nathaniel C. 
(App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 Cal.Rptr. 236, 228 Cal.App.3d 990. 
Enhancement pursuant to this chapter does not require 
that each predicate offense be committed by two or more 
person*; it requires only that the offenses be committed 
on separate occasions or be committed by two or more 
persons. In re Nathaniel C. ^App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 
Cal.Rptr. 236. 228 Cal.App.3d 990. 
Evidence established time that predicate offenses for 
enhancement of sentence pursuant to this chapter oc-
curred; evidence showed that one of the offenses was substantial part of his time and efforts to criminal street 
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incident on October 12, 1989, which gave rise to charges 
against juvenile and that a second assault by gang mem-
ber? occurred ua few months" before the March 1990 
hearing, thus showing that at least one of the predicate 
offenses occurred after September 23, 1988, the effective 
date of the chapter, and that one predicate offense oc-
curred within three years of the first In re Nathaniel C. 
(App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 990. 
7.5. Admissibility of evidence 
Hearsay from police reports and conversations with 
investigating officers concerning charged incident, as well 
as other information gathered by police in field, is reason-
able basis for officer's expert opinion on matters related to 
criminal street gang, but officer may not simply recite 
what he was told and must provide foundational testimony 
for opinions which is sufficiently corroborated by other 
competent physical and testimonial evidence. People v. 
Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 33 Cal 
App.4th 1509, 38 CalApp.4th 1125, as modified, review 
granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr 2d 678, 899 
P.2d64. 
Other acts evidence of defendant's ^ang related activi-
ties was admissible to reveal circumstances of first-degree 
murder and to prove street gang enhancement; the evi-
dence was not directed at disposition to commit other 
crimes. People v. Martin (App. 6 Dist 1994) 28 Cal 
Rptr^d 660, 23 CaLApp.4th 76, modified on denial of 
rehearing, review denied. 
7.6. Expert testimony 
Expert witness had reasonable basis to give testimony 
and opinions that assaults with deadly weapons were one 
of primary activities of gang, for purposes of establishing 
offense of participation in criminal street gang, in light of 
expert's background and training, personal knowledge and 
experience with gang of which defendant was alleged to 
be member, information gathered from contact and con-
versations with members of gang, and information con-
tained in police department's files. People v. Loeun (App. 
6 Dist 1995) 40 CaLRpn\2d 160, 33 CaLApp.4th 1509, 38 
Cal.App.4th 1125, as modified, review granted and opinion 
superseded 43 CaLRptr .2d 678, 899 P.2d 64. 
Fact that expert witness relied in part on hearsay about 
particular incident did not render improper or inadmissi-
ble expert's opinion that assaults with deadly weapons 
were one of primary activities of gang, for purposes of 
establishing offense of participation in criminal street 
gang, in light of expert's further reliance on personal 
knowledge, observations, experience and investigation, 
and in light of particularity of hearsay used by expert 
People v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 CaLRptr .2d 160, 33 
CaLApp.4th 1509, 38 CaLApp.4th 1125, as modified, review 
granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr.2d 678, 899 
P.2d 64. 
8. Sufficiency of evidence 
Opinion of expert witness coupled with circumstances of 
alleged attack by defendant and other gang members 
supported finding that one of street gang's primary activi-
ties was commission of assaults with deadly weapons, 
which thus supported conviction for participating in crimi-
nal street gang; expert explained motivation of gang to 
commit assaults and gang's history of assaults, and 
charged incident involved apparent attempt to protect 
gang's turf. People v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 
Cai.Rptr.2d 160, 33 CalA.pp.4th 1509, 38 Cal.App.4th 1125, 
as modified, review granted and opinion superseded 43 
Cal.Rptr.2d 678, S99 P.2d 64. 
Expert testimony of police officer, who investigated 
murder and had experience with gangs, that murder 
§ 186.22 
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that gang was sufficient to establish that murder wis 
committed for the benefit of the gang, for purposes of 
cnminal street gang enhancement People v. Olguin 
(App. 4 Dist 1994) 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596, 31 CaLApp.4th 
1355, rehearing denied, review denied. 
Gang expert's opinion hearsay testimony that facts un-
derlying prior convictions involved gang-related crimes 
was insufficient to support convictions of criminal street 
gang offenses and criminal street gang sentence enhance-
ments; expert's testimony regarding facts underlying con-
victions not elicited in form of hypothetical question was 
secondhand testimony which could not constitute substan-
tial evidence that required predicate offense by gang 
member occurred, and expert's opinion testimony elicited 
in form of hypothetical questions was not supported by 
competent evidence establishing existence of the facts 
upon which the hypothetical questions were based Peo-
ple v. Gardeley (App. 6 Dist 1994) 36 CaLRptr .2d 136, 30 
CaLApp.4th 402, 34 Cal.App.4th 1614, review granted and 
opinion superseded 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 406, 890 P.2d 1115. 
Enhancement of attempted murder defendant's sen-
tence on ground that crime was committed in association 
with criminal street gang was sufficiently supported by 
evidence that predicate offenses committed by other gang 
members were gang related and that intended victim of 
instant offense was member of rival gang who had recent-
ly been involved in shooting of member of defendant's 
gang. People v. Gamez (App. 4 Dist 1991) 286 CaLRptr. 
894, 235 CaLApp3d 967. 
Conclusional testimony that gang members had previ-
ously engaged in enumerated offenses, based on nonspe-
cific hearsay and arrest information which does not speci-
fy exactly who, when, where, and under what circum-
stances gang crimes were committed, does not constitute 
substantial evidence necessary for criminal street gang 
sentencing enhancement Matter of Jose T. (App. 2 Dial 
1991) 282 CaLRptr. 75, 230 CaLApp3d 1455, review de-
nied 
Where evidence failed to show that more than one 
member of street gang engaged in commission or attempt-
ed commission of assault with a deadly weapon on particu-
lar occasion, although others were present, that incident 
could not establish pattern of criminal gang activity re-
quired for enhancement of sentence pursuant to this 
chapter. In re Nathi^iiel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 
CaLRptr. 236, 228 Cal.App.3d 990. 
Evidence established proof of commission or attempted 
commission of assault with a deadly weapon by a member 
of street gang for purposes of sentence enhancement 
pursuant to this chapter; evidence showed that one admit-
ted member of gang was armed with segment of a stair-
way rail and that he got out of a van approximately 30 feet 
away from members of another gang and gave chase while 
still armed with the handrail and that he admitted that if 
he had caught one of the other gang members, - I guess he 
would have just got beat" In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1 
Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 236, 228 CaLApp.3d 990. 
Police officer's testimony which consisted of only non-
specific hearsay of suspected shooting of one gang mem-
ber by another was insufficient to establish predicate 
offense for sentence enhancement pursuant to this chap-
ter. In re Nathaniel C. (App. 1 Dist 1991) 279 CaLRptr. 
236, 228 Cal.App.3d 990. 
Evidence was not sufficient to support finding that 
group infant participated with was a "criminal street 
gang" and thus was not sufficient to support finding that 
infant was guilty of offense of participation in a criminal 
street gang; there was no evidence to show a pattern of 
criminal gang activity by the infant's group, as there was 
no evidence in record to establish that the charged offense 
occurred within three years after a prior offense which benefited one gang because it promoted the respect of 
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was committed on a separate occasion, or by two or more 
gang members. In re Lincoln J. (App. 2 Dist 1990) 272 
Cal.Rptr. S52, 223 CaLApp.3d 322. 
Infant's adjudication of guilt for offense of assault by 
means of force likely to produce great bodDy injury could 
Hot be enhanced under subd. (hXl) of this section, where 
there was insufficient evidence to support finding of 
Mcriminal street gang." In re Lincoln J. (App. 2 Dist 
1990) 272 CaLRptr. 862, 223 CaLApp^d 322. 
In order for a criminal street gang sentence enhance-
ment to be sustained the court must find the existence of 
^CTiminal street gang" and the record must contain sub-
stantial evidence to support that finding. In re Lincoln J. 
(App. 2 Dist 1990) 272 CaLRptr. 852, 223 CaLApp.3d 322. 
"Expert testimony" by member of police department 
youth gang task force that gang to which juvenile alleged-
ly belonged had engaged in sale of rock cocaine, commit-
ted vehicle theft, and been involved in assault with deadly 
Weapon was not substantial evidence that gang was en-
gaged in "pattern of criminal gang activity"; testimony 
Was based on nonspecific hearsay and arrest information 
and fefl far short of requisite of this section. In re Leland 
D. (App. 5 Dist 1990) 272 CaLRptr. 709, 223 CaLApp-3d 
261. 
9* Gang purposes or benefit 
Evidence supported jury finding that murder was com-
ntftted for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in associa-
tion with a criminal street gang, with specific intent to 
Promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by 
g&ng members and, thus, supported criminal street gang 
enhancement; shooting was precipitated by crossing out 
gkng graffiti, replacing it with the name of another gang, 
**id then shouting that gang's name to rival gang mem-
ber*. People v. Olguin (App. 4 Dist 1994) 37 CaLRpd\2d 
5$6, 31 CaLApp.4th 1366, rehearing denied, review denied 
For purposes of statute setting forth punishment for 
Person who actively participates in any criminal street 
g*ng and willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any 
felonious criminal conduct by members of a gang, a pat-
tern of gang activity may include charged crime. People 
v. Olguin (App. 4 Dist 1994) 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596, 31 
C*LApp.4th 1355, rehearing denied, review denied. 
In prosecution for criminal street gang offense or when 
st&te is seeking criminal street gang sentence enhance-
ment, it must be shown that predicate crimes were gang 
related, as statute requires prosecution to prove that gang 
has as one of its primary activities the commission of one 
or more of eight enumerated offenses. People v. Garde-
ley (App. 6 Dist 1994) 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 136. 30 CaLApp.4th 
402, 34 CaLApp.4th 1614, review granted and opinion 
superseded 39 Cal.Rp&\2d 406, 890 P.2d 1115. 
Robbery, murder, and attempted murder of rival gang 
number were committed for gang purposes within mean-
ing of criminal 3treet gang sentence enhancement imposed 
iu juvenile proc^-dmg; robbery was committed by jang 
numbers for pun'ose of later drive-by shooting, and mur-
der and attempted murder was directed at members of 
rival gangs. Matter of Jose T. (App. 2 Dist 1991) 282 
Cal.Rptr. 75, 230 Cal.App.3d 1455, review denied 
10. Bifurcation 
defendant was not entitled to bifurcation of murder 
tri^l and enhancement for gang activity; enhancement 
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concerned mental element present in commissioo in the 
underlying crime, and same witnesses and much of same 
evidence used to prove murder were also relevant to 
establish circumstances and intent of killing. People v. 
Martin (App. 6 Dist 1994) 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 660, 23 CaL 
App.4th 76, modified on denial of rehearing, review de-
nied 
After determining that evidence of gang affiliation and 
activity was relevant to prove motive, malice, premedita-
tion, and intent with respect to murder charge against 
defendant, trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting evidence of nine prior incidents of intergang 
retaliation; aD incidents, even those in which defendant 
was not directly involved and those involving attacks by 
rival S*ng, were relevant to issue of defendant's motive in 
attacking member of rival gang. People v. Funes (App. 1 
Dist 1994) 28 CaLRptrJW 758, 23 CaHpp.4th 1506, modi-
fied on denial of rehearing, review denied. 
Evidence of defe: Want's gang affiliation and activity was 
relevant to prove motive, malice, premeditation, and intent 
with respect to murder charge against defendant, and trial 
court ^as thus justified in denying motion to sever or 
bifurcate gang affiliation charges from murder charge; 
evidence regarding gang affiliation and activity directly 
related to defendant's motive for attacking member of 
rival g*ng, as well as his intent in doing so. People v. 
Funes (App. 1 Dist 1994) 28 CaLRptr^d 758, 23 CaL 
App.4th 1506, modified on denial of rehearing, review 
denied 
11. fnijtructionj 
Jury could be presumed to have Mowed trial court's 
instruction limiting use of hearsay about prior street gang 
incident only to establish basis for expert's opinion, rather 
than improperly relying on hearsay as evidence of predi-
cate offepflp to establish pattern of criminal gang activity. 
People v. Loeun (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 CaLRpd\2d 160, 38 
CaLApp.4th 1509, 38 CaLApp.4th 1125, as modified review 
granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptrJZd 678, 899 
P.2d64. 
Instruction defining "pattern of criminal gang activity" 
within meaning of Street Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention Act did not have to include a requirement that 
gang's Criminal actions amount to or pose the threat of 
continued criminal activity. People v. Olguin (App. 4 Dist 
1994) 37 CaLRptr 2d 596, 31 CaLApp.4th 1355, rehearing 
denied, review denied 
12. Injunction 
Whether California Street Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention (STEP) Act authorized injunction issued by 
trial court to abate gang activity was not an issue, even if 
trial court relied on Act in error, since city, in requesting 
injunction, based its complaint only on public nuisance 
law. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (App. 6 Dist 1995) 40 
Ca}.Hptr2d 589, 34 CalAppAth 136, review granted and 
opinion Superseded 43 CaLRptr^d 680, 899 P2d 66. 
CalifoFnia Street Terrorism Enforcement and Preven-
tion (STl£P) Act is not exclusive means of enjoining street 
gang activity. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (App. 6 Dist 
1995) 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 589, 34 CaL\pp.4th 136, review 
granted and opinion superseded 43 CaLRptr.2d 680, 899 
P.2d 66. 
5 186.22a. B u i l d i n g s or places used by criminal street gangs; nuisance; additional remedies; 
conf i scat ion of f irearms or deadly or dangerous weapons owned or possessed by gang 
members 
(a) Every building or place used by members of a criiriinal street gang for the purpose of the 
coinmission of the offenses listed in subdivision (c) of Section 186.22 or any offense involving dangerous or 
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deadly weapons, burglary, or rape, and every building or place wherein or upon which that criminal 
conduct by gang members takes place, is a nuisance which shall be enjoined, abated, and prevented, and 
for which damages may be recovered, whether it is a public or private nuisance. 
(b) Any action for injunction or abatement filed pursuant to • • • subdivision (a) shall proceed 
according to the provisions of Article 3 (commencing with Section 11570) of Chapter 10 of Division 10 of 
the Health and Safety Code, except that all of the following shall apply: 
(1) The court shall not assess a civil penalty against any person unless that person knew or should have 
known of the unlawful acts. 
(2) No order of eviction or closure may be entered. 
(3) All injunctions issued shall be limited to those necessary to protect the health and safety of the 
residents or the public or those necessary to prevent further criminal activity. 
(4) Suit may not be filed until 30-day notice of the unlawful use or criminal conduct has been provided 
to the owner by mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, to the last known address. 
(c) No nonprofit or charitable organization which is conducting its affairs with ordinary care or skill, 
and no governmental entity, shall be abated pursuant to • * • subdivisions (a) and (b). 
(d) Nothing in this chapter shall preclude any aggrieved person from seeking any other remedy 
provided by law. 
(e) (1) Any firearm, ammunition which may be used with the firearm, or any deadly or dangerous 
weapon which is owned or possessed by a member of a criminal street gang for the purpose of the 
commission of any of the offenses listed in subdivision (c) of Section 186.22, or the commission of any 
burglary or rape, may be confiscated by any law enforcement agency or peace officer. 
(2) In those cases where a law enforcement agency believes that the return of the firearm, ammunition, 
or deadly weapon confiscated pursuant to this subdivision, is or will be used in criminal street gang 
activity or that the return of the item would be likely to result in endangering the safety of others, the 
law enforcement agency shall initiate a petition in the superior court to determine if the item confiscated 
should be returned or declared a nuisance. 
(3) No firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon shall be sold or destroyed unless reasonable notice is 
given to its lawful owner if his or her identity and address can be reasonably ascertained. The law 
enforcement agency shall inform the lawful owner, at that person's last known address by registered 
mail, that he or she has 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice to respond to the court clerk to 
confirm his or her desire for a hearing and that the failure to respond shall result in a default order 
forfeiting the confiscated firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon as a nuisance. 
(4) If the person requests a hearing, the court clerk shaD set a hearing no later than 30 days from 
receipt of that request The court clerk shall notify the person, the law enforcement agency involved, and 
the district attorney of the date, time, and place of the hearing. 
(5) At the hearing, the burden of proof is upon the law enforcement agency or peace officer to show by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the seized item is or will be used in criminal street gang activity or 
that return of the item would be likely to result in endangering the safety of others. All returns of 
firearms shall be subject to subdivision (d) of Section 12072. 
(6) If the person does not request a hearing within 30 days of the notice or the lawful owner cannot be 
ascertained, the law enforcement agency may file a petition that the confiscated firearm, ammunition, or 
deadly weapon be declared a nuisance. If the items are declared to be a nuisance, the law enforcement 
agency shall dispose of the items as provided in Section 12028. 
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988. Amended by Stats.1990, c. 223 (A.B.3485), § 1; 
Stats.1991, c. 260 (S.B.809), § 1.) 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
1990 Legislation visions (a) and (b)" for "this chapter"; and added subd le) 
The 1990 amendment deleted u, other than residential relating to confiscation of firearms or deadly or dangerous 
buildings in which there are three or fewer dwelling weapons owned or possessed by criminal street gang 
units," twice in subd. (a) following "building or other members. 
place". 
1991 Legislation 
The 1991 amendment in subd. (b) substituted "subdivi-
sion (af for "this section"; in subd. (c) substituted "subdi-
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Law Review Commentaries 
Review of selected 1990 California legislation. 22 Pac. Review of selected 1991 California legislation. 23 Pac. 
LJ. 501 vl991). LJ. 667 (1992). 
Library References 
California Practice Guide: Landlord-Tenant, Friedman, chapter paragraph number references to paragraphs 
Garcia & Hagarty, see Guide's Table of Statutes for discussing this section. 
§ 186.23. Mutual aid activities; labor organizations 
This chapter does not apply to employees engaged in concerted activities for their mutual aid and 
protection, or the activities of labor organizations or their members or agents. 
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988.) 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
1988 Legislation 
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the 
same session of the legislature, see Government Code 
§ 9605. 
Library References 
California Jury Instructions—Criminal [CALJIC], 
S 186.24. Severability 
If any part or provision of this chapter, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held 
invalid, the remainder of the chapter, including the application of that part or provision to other persons 
or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby and shall continue in full force and effect To this end, the 
provisions of this chapter are severable. 
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c 1256, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988.) 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
1988 Legislation 
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the 
same session of the legislature, 3ee Government Code 
§ 9605. 
§ 186.25. Local laws; preemption 
Nothing in this chapter shall prevent a local governing body from adopting and enforcing laws 
consistent with this chapter relating to gangs and gang violence. Where local laws duplicate or 
supplement this chapter, this chapter shall be construed as providing alternative remedies and not as 
preempting the field. 
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c 1256, § 1, eff. Sept 26, 1988.) 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
1988 Legislation 
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the 
same session of the legislature, see Government Code 
§ 9605. 
§ 186.26. Criminal street gang; violent coercion to participate; offense 
(a) Any adult who utilizes physical violence to coerce, induce, or solicit another person who is under 18 
years of age to actively participate in any criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 
186.22, the members of which engage in a pattern of criminal gang activity, as defined in subdivision (e) of 
Section 186.22, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for one, two, or three years. 
(b) Any adult who threatens a minor with physical violence on two or more separate occasions within 
any 30-day period with the intent to coerce, induce, or solicit the minor to actively participate in a 
Additions or changes indicated by underline; deletions by asterisks * * * 
90 
PENAL CODE § 186.28 
criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 186.22, the members of which engage in a 
pattern of criminal gang activity, as defined in subdivision (e) of Section 186.22, shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison for one, two, or three years or in a county jail for up to one year. 
(c) A minor who is 16 years of age or older who commits an offense described in subdivision (a) or (b) 
is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit prosecution'under any other provision of the law. 
(e) No person shall be convicted of violating this section based upon speech alone, except upon a 
showing that the speech itself threatened violence against a specific person, that the defendant had the 
apparent ability to carry out the threat, and that physical harm was imminently likely to occur. 
(Added by Stats.1993, c. 567 (AB.514), § 1.) 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
19S8 Legislation 
Addition of § 186.26 as part of Chapter 11, Street 
Terrorism Enforcement And Prevention Act, added by 
Stats. 1988, c. 1242, § 1, failed to become operative due to 
addition of Chapter 11, Street Terrorism Enforcement 
And Prevention Act, by Stata.1988, c 1256, § 1. See 
Gov.C. § 9605. 
1988 Legislation 
Effect of addition of section by two or more acts at the 
sarre session of the legislature, see Government Code 
(2) The firearm is used to commit the felony. 
Firearms, supply, sell, or give possession to person 
participating in criminal street gangs, 3ee Penal Code 
§ 186.28. 
Review of selected 1992 California legislation. 24 Pac 
LJ. 755 (1993). 
Provisions similar to those contained in § 186J26 were 
contained in § 5 of Stats.1988, c. 1256. See Historical 
Note under § 186.20. 
1992 Legislation 
Addition of this section by § 1 of Stats.1992, c. 920 
(A.B.2717), failed to become operative under the provi-
sions of § 2 of that Act 
1991 Legislation 
The 1991 amendment substituted "1997" for "1992" as 
the year for repeal of the chapter. 
§ 186*28. Firearms; supply, sell or give possession; participation in criminal street gangs 
(a) Any person, corporation, or firm who shall knowingly supply, sell, or give possession or control of 
any firearm to another shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, or in a county jail for a 
term not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine 
and imprisonment if all of the following apply: 
(1) The person, corporation, or firm has actual knowledge that the person will use the firearm to 
commit a felony described in subdivision (e) of Section 18622, while actively participating in any criminal 
street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 186.22, the members of which engage in a pattern of 
criminal activity, as defined in subdivision (e) of Section 18622. 
(3) A conviction for the felony violation under subdivision fe) of Section 186.22 has first been obtained 
of the person to whom the firearm was supplied, sold, or given possession or control pursuant to this 
section. 
Oo) This section shall only be applicable where the person is not convicted as a principal to the felony 
offense committed by the person to whom the firearm was supplied, sold, or given possession or control 
pursuant to this section. 
(Added by Stats.1992, c. 370 (S.B.437), § 1.) 
Cross References 
Law Review Commentaries 
§ 186.27. Duration of chapter 
This chapter shall remain in effect only until January 1, 1997, and as of that date is repealed, unless a 
later enacted statute, which is chaptered before January 1, 1997, deletes or extends that date. 
(Added by Stats.1988, c. 1242, § 1, eft Sept. 26, 1988; Stats.1988, c. 1256, § 1, eft Sept 26, 1988. 
Amended by Stats.1991, c. 201 (A.B.1135), § 2.) 
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